Foreign Terrorist Organizations are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.
The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the State Department (S/CT) continually monitors the activities of terrorist groups active around the world to identify potential targets for designation. When reviewing potential targets, S/CT looks not only at the actual terrorist attacks that a group has carried out, but also at whether the group has engaged in planning and preparations for possible future acts of terrorism or retains the capability and intent to carry out such acts.
Designation
Once a target is identified, S/CT prepares a detailed "administrative record," which is a compilation of information, typically including both classified and open sources information, demonstrating that the statutory criteria for designation have been satisfied. If the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, decides to make the designation, Congress is notified of the Secretary’s intent to designate the organization and given seven days to review the designation, as the INA requires. Upon the expiration of the seven-day waiting period, notice of the designation is published in the Federal Register, at which point the designation takes effect. An organization designated as an FTO may seek judicial review of the designation in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit not later than 30 days after the designation is published in the Federal Register.
FTO designations expire automatically after two years, but the Secretary of State may re-designate an organization for additional two-year period(s), upon a finding that the statutory criteria continue to be met. The procedural requirements for designating an organization as an FTO also apply to any re-designation of that organization. The Secretary of State may revoke a designation or re-designation at any time upon a finding that the circumstances that were the basis for the designation or re-designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant revocation, or that the national security of the United States warrants a revocation. The same procedural requirements apply to revocations made by the Secretary of State as apply to designations or re-designations. A designation may also be revoked by an Act of Congress, or set aside by a Court order.
Legal Criteria for Designation
(Reflecting Amendments to Section 219 of the INA in the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001)
1. It must be a foreign organization.
2. The organization must engage in terrorist activity, as defined in section 212 (a)(3)(B) of the INA (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)),* or terrorism, as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)),** or retain the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism.
3. The organization’s terrorist activity or terrorism must threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the national security (national defense, foreign relations, or the economic interests) of the United States.
Legal Ramifications of Designation
1. It is unlawful for a person in the United States or subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to knowingly provide "material support or resources" to a designated FTO. (The term "material support or resources" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b) as "currency or monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assistance, safe houses, false documentation or identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets, except medicine or religious materials.)
2. Representatives and members of a designated FTO, if they are aliens, are inadmissible to and, in certain circumstances, removable from the United States (see 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182 (a)(3)(B)(i)(IV)-(V), 1227 (a)(1)(A)).
3. Any U.S. financial institution that becomes aware that it has possession of or control over funds in which a designated FTO or its agent has an interest must retain possession of or control over the funds and report the funds to the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Other Effects of Designation
1. Supports our efforts to curb terrorism financing and to encourage other nations to do the same.
2. Stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.
3. Deters donations or contributions to and economic transactions with named organizations.
4. Heightens public awareness and knowledge of terrorist organizations.
5. Signals to other governments our concern about named organizations.
A History of Designated Terrorist Groups
• Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Iraq, Russia
Al-Banna relocated to Iraq in December 1998 where the group maintained a presence until Operation Iraqi Freedom, but its current status in country is unknown. Known members have an operational presence in Lebanon, including in several Palestinian refugee camps. Authorities shut down the ANO’s operations in Libya and Egypt in 1999. The group has demonstrated the ability to operate over a wide area, including the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. However, financial problems and internal disorganization have greatly reduced the group’s activities and its ability to maintain cohesive terrorist capability.
Description
The ANO international terrorist organization was founded by Sabri al-Banna (a.k.a. Abu Nidal) after splitting from the PLO in 1974. The group’s previous known structure consisted of various functional committees, including political, military, and financial. In November 2002 Abu Nidal died in Baghdad; the new leadership of the organization remains unclear.
Activities
The ANO has carried out terrorist attacks in 20 countries, killing or injuring almost 900 persons. Targets include the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Israel, moderate Palestinians, the PLO, and various Arab countries. Major attacks included the Rome and Vienna airports in 1985, the Neve Shalom synagogue in Istanbul, the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi in 1986, and the City of Poros day-excursion ship attack in Greece in 1988. The ANO is suspected of assassinating PLO deputy chief Abu Iyad and PLO security chief Abu Hul in Tunis in 1991. The ANO assassinated a Jordanian diplomat in Lebanon in 1994 and has been linked to the killing of the PLO representative there. The group has not staged a major attack against Western targets since the late 1980s.
Strengths
Few hundred plus limited overseas support structure.
External Aid
The ANO received considerable support, including safe haven, training, logistical assistance, and financial aid from Iraq, Libya, and Syria (until 1987), in addition to close support for selected operations.
• Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
Locations/Area of Operations
East Asia / Pacific - Malaysia, Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
The ASG was founded in Basilan Province and operates there and in the neighboring provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the Sulu Archipelago. The group also operates on the Zamboanga peninsula, and members occasionally travel to Manila. In mid-2003, the group started operating in the major city of Cotobato and on the coast of Sultan Kudarat on Mindanao. The group expanded its operational reach to Malaysia in 2000 when it abducted foreigners from a tourist resort.
Description
The ASG is primarily a small, violent Muslim terrorist group operating in the southern Philippines. Some ASG leaders allegedly fought in Afghanistan during the Soviet war and are students and proponents of radical Islamic teachings. The group split from the much larger Moro National Liberation Front in the early 1990s under the leadership of Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani, who was killed in a clash with Philippine police in December 1998. His younger brother, Khadaffy Janjalani, replaced him as the nominal leader of the group and appears to have consolidated power.
Activities
The ASG engages in kidnappings for ransom, bombings, beheadings, assassinations, and extortion. The group’s stated goal is to promote an independent Islamic state in western Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago (areas in the southern Philippines heavily populated by Muslims) but the ASG has primarily used terror for financial profit. Recent bombings may herald a return to a more radical, politicized agenda, at least among certain factions. The group’s first large-scale action was a raid on the town of Ipil in Mindanao in April 1995. In April of 2000, an ASG faction kidnapped 21 persons, including 10 Western tourists, from a resort in Malaysia. On May 27, 2001, the ASG kidnapped three US citizens and 17 Filipinos from a tourist resort in Palawan, Philippines. Several of the hostages, including US citizen Guillermo Sobero, were murdered. During a Philippine military hostage rescue operation on June 7, 2002, US hostage Gracia Burnham was rescued, but her husband Martin Burnham and Filipina Deborah Yap were killed. Philippine authorities say that the ASG had a role in the bombing near a Philippine military base in Zamboanga in October 2002 that killed a US serviceman. In February 2004, Khadaffy Janjalani’s faction bombed SuperFerry 14 in Manila Bay, killing approximately 132, and in March, Philippine authorities arrested an ASG cell whose bombing targets included the US Embassy in Manila.
Strengths
Estimated to have 200 to 500 members
External Aid
Largely self-financing through ransom and extortion; has received support from Islamic extremists in the Middle East and may receive support from regional terrorist groups. Libya publicly paid millions of dollars for the release of the foreign hostages seized from Malaysia in 2000.
• Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
Description
The al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade comprises an unknown number of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists that emerged at the outset of the current intifadah to attack Israeli targets. It aims to drive the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Jerusalem and to establish a Palestinian state.
Activities
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade has carried out shootings and suicide operations against Israeli military personnel and civilians and has killed Palestinians who it believed were collaborating with Israel. At least five US citizens, four of them dual Israeli-US citizens, were killed in these attacks. The group probably did not attack them because of their US citizenship. In January 2002, the group claimed responsibility for the first suicide bombing carried out by a female.
Strength
Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation
Al-Aqsa operates mainly in the West Bank and has claimed attacks inside Israel and the Gaza Strip.
External Aid
Unknown.
• Al-Badhr Mujahidin (Al-Badr)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Afghanistan, Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
Description
The Al Badhr Mujahedin split from Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM) in 1998. Traces its origins to 1971, when a group named Al Badr attacked Bengalis in East Pakistan. Later operated as part of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-I Islami (HIG) in Afghanistan and, from 1990, as a unit of HM in Kashmir. The group was relatively inactive until 2000. Since then, it has increasingly claimed responsibility for attacks against Indian military targets.
Activities
Has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Jammu and Kashmir.
Strengths
Perhaps several hundred.
External Aid
Unknown.
• Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group, IG)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Saint Vincent And Grenadines
Operates mainly in the al-Minya, Asyut, Qina, and Sohaj Governorates of southern Egypt. Also appears to have support in Cairo, Alexandria, and other urban locations, particularly among unemployed graduates and students. Has a worldwide presence, including in the United Kingdom, Afghanistan, Yemen, and various locations in Europe
Description
The IG, Egypt?s largest militant group, has been active since the late 1970s, and is a loosely organized network. It has an external wing with supporters in several countries. The group?s issuance of a cease-fire in 1997 led to a split into two factions: one, led by Mustafa Hamza, supported the cease-fire; the other, led by Rifa?i Taha Musa, called for a return to armed operations. The IG issued another ceasefire in March 1999, but its spiritual leader, Shaykh Umar Abd al-Rahman, sentenced to life in prison in January 1996 for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and incarcerated in the United States, rescinded his support for the cease-fire in June 2000. IG has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since the Luxor attack in 1997, which killed 58 tourists and four Egyptians and wounded dozens more. In February 1998, a senior member signed Usama Bin Ladin?s fatwa calling for attacks against the United States.
In early 2001, Taha Musa published a book in which he attempted to justify terrorist attacks that would cause mass casualties. Taha Musa disappeared several months thereafter, and there is no information as to his current whereabouts. In March 2002, members of the group?s historic leadership in Egypt declared use of violence misguided and renounced its future use, prompting denunciations by much of the leadership abroad. The Egyptian Government continues to release IG members from prison, including approximately 900 in 2003; likewise, most of the 700 persons released in 2004 at the end of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan were IG members.
For IG members still dedicated to violent jihad, their primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state. Disaffected IG members, such as those inspired by Taha Musa or Abd al-Rahman, may be interested in carrying out attacks against US interests.
Activities
IG conducted armed attacks against Egyptian security and other Government officials, Coptic Christians, and Egyptian opponents of Islamic extremism before the cease-fire. After the 1997 cease-fire, the faction led by Taha Musa launched attacks on tourists in Egypt, most notably the attack in November 1997 at Luxor. IG also claimed responsibility for the attempt in June 1995 to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
Strengths
Unknown. At its peak IG probably commanded several thousand hard-core members and a like number of sympathizers. The 1999 cease-fire, security crackdowns following the attack in Luxor in 1997 and, more recently, security efforts following September 11 probably have resulted in a substantial decrease in the group’s numbers.
External Aid
Unknown. There is some evidence that Usama bin Ladin and Afghan militant groups support the organization. IG also may obtain some funding through various Islamic non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
• Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) a.k.a. Islamic Union
Locations/Area of Operations
Sub-Saharan Africa - Ethiopia, Kenya, Portugal
Primarily in Somalia, with a presence in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, Kenya, and possibly Djibouti.
Description
AIAI rose to prominence in the Horn of Africa in the early 1990s, following the downfall of the Siad Barre regime and the subsequent collapse of the Somali nation state into anarchy. AIAI was not internally cohesive and suffered divisions between factions supporting moderate Islam and more puritanical Islamic ideology. Following military defeats in 1996 and 1997, AIAI evolved into a loose network of highly compartmentalized cells, factions, and individuals with no central control or coordination. AIAI elements pursue a variety of agendas ranging from social services and education to insurgency activities in the Ogaden. Some AIAI-associated sheikhs espouse a radical fundamentalist version of Islam, with particular emphasis on a strict adherence to Sharia (Islamic law), a view often at odds with Somali emphasis on clan identity. A small number of AIAI-associated individuals have provided logistical support to and maintain ties with al-Qa’ida; however, the network’s central focus remains the establishment of an Islamic government in Somalia.
Activities
Elements of AIAI may have been responsible for the kidnapping and murder of relief workers in Somalia and Somaliland in 2003 and 2004, and during the late 1990s. Factions of AIAI may also have been responsible for a series of bomb attacks in public places in Addis Ababa in 1996 and 1997. Most AIAI factions have recently concentrated on broadening their religious base, renewed emphasis on building businesses, and undertaking "hearts and minds" actions, such as sponsoring orphanages and schools and providing security that uses an Islamic legal structure in the areas where it is active.
Strengths
The actual membership strength is unknown.
External Aid
Receives funds from Middle East financiers and Somali diaspora communities in Europe, North America, and the Arabian Peninsula.
• Al-Jama’a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya a.k.a. Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, Fighting Islamic Group, Libyan Fighting Group, Libyan Islamic Group
Description:
Emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Declared the Government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government, interests but others are aligned with Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qaida organization or are active in the international mujahidin network.
Activities:
Claimed responsibility for a failed assassination attempt against Qadhafi in 1996 and engaged Libyan security forces in armed clashes during the mid to late 1990s. Currently engages in few armed attacks against Libyan interests either in Libya or abroad. Some members may be aligned with al-Qaida or involved in al-Qaida activities.
Strength
Not known but probably has several hundred active members.
Location/Area of Operation
Probably maintains a clandestine presence in Libya, but since late 1990s many members have fled to various Middle Eastern and European countries.
External Aid
Not known. May obtain some funding through private donations, various Islamic non-governmental organizations, and criminal acts.
• Al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Jihad Group, Islamic Jihad)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Egypt, Saint Vincent And Grenadines
Historically AJ operated in the Cairo area. Most AJ members today are outside Egypt in countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Lebanon, the United Kingdom, and Yemen. AJ activities have been centered outside Egypt for several years under the auspices of al-Qa’ida.
Description
This Egyptian Islamic extremist group merged with Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida organization in 2001. Usama Bin Ladin’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, was the former head of AJ. Active since the 1970s, AJ’s primary goal has been the overthrow of the Egyptian Government and the establishment of an Islamic state. The group’s primary targets, historically, have been high-level Egyptian Government officials as well as US and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad. Regular Egyptian crackdowns on extremists, including on AJ, have greatly reduced AJ capabilities in Egypt.
Activities
The original AJ was responsible for the 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. It claimed responsibility for the attempted assassinations of Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfi in August 1993 and Prime Minister Atef Sedky in November 1993. AJ has not conducted an attack inside Egypt since 1993 and has never successfully targeted foreign tourists there. The group was responsible for the Egyptian Embassy bombing in Islamabad in 1995 and a disrupted plot against the US Embassy in Albania in 1998.
Strengths
Unknown, but probably has several hundred hard-core members inside and outside of Egypt.
External Aid
Unknown. Since 1998 AJ received most of its funding from al-Qa’ida, and these close ties culminated in the eventual merger of the groups. Some funding may come from various Islamic non-governmental organizations, cover businesses, and criminal acts.
• Al-Qaida a.k.a. Qa'idat al-Jihad
Locations/Area of Operations
Worldwide
Al-Qaida has cells worldwide and is reinforced by its ties to Sunni extremist networks. Was based in Afghanistan until Coalition forces removed the Taliban from power in late 2001. Al-Qaida has dispersed in small groups across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East and probably will attempt to carry out future attacks against US interests.
Description
Established by Usama Bin Ladin in the late 1980s to bring together Arabs who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet Union. Helped finance, recruit, transport, and train Sunni Islamic extremists for the Afghan resistance. Current goal is to establish a pan- Islamic Caliphate throughout the world by working with allied Islamic extremist groups to overthrow regimes it deems "non-Islamic" and expelling Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries particularly Saudi Arabia. Issued statement under banner of "the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders" in February 1998, saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill US citizens civilian or military and their allies everywhere. Merged with Egyptian Islamic Jihad (Al-Jihad) in June 2001. First designated in October 1999. Location: Al-Qaida has cells worldwide and is reinforced by its ties to Sunni extremist networks. Was based in Afghanistan until Coalition forces removed the Taliban from power in late 2001. Al-Qaida has dispersed in small groups across South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East and probably will attempt to carry out future attacks against US interests.
Activities
In 2003, carried out the assault and bombing on 12 May of three expatriate housing complexes in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed 20 and injured 139. Assisted in carrying out the bombings on 16 May in Casablanca, Morocco, of a Jewish center, restaurant, nightclub, and hotel that killed 41 and injured 101. Probably supported the bombing of the J.W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 5 August that killed 17 and injured 137. Responsible for the assault and bombing on 9 November of a housing complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, that killed 17 and injured 100. Conducted the bombings of two synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey, on 15 November that killed 23 and injured 200 and the bombings in Istanbul of the British Consulate and HSBC Bank on 20 November that resulted in 27 dead and 455 injured. Has been involved in some attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In 2002, carried out bombing on 28 November of hotel in Mombasa, Kenya, killing 15 and injuring 40. Probably supported a nightclub bombing in Bali, Indonesia, on 12 October that killed about 180. Responsible for an attack on US military personnel in Kuwait, on 8 October, that killed one US soldier and injured another. Directed a suicide attack on the MV Limburg off the coast of Yemen, on 6 October that killed one and injured four. Carried out a firebombing of a synagogue in Tunisia on 11 April that killed 19 and injured 22. On 11 September 2001, 19 al-Qaida suicide attackers hijacked and crashed four US commercial jets two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and a fourth into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, leaving about 3,000 individuals dead or missing. Directed the attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, on 12 October 2000 killing 17 US Navy members and injuring another 39.
Conducted the bombings in August 1998 of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, that killed at least 301 individuals and injured more than 5,000 others.Claims to have shot down US helicopters and killed US servicemen in Somalia in 1993 and to have conducted three bombings that targeted US troops in Aden, Yemen, in December 1992.
Al-Qaida is linked to the following plans that were disrupted or not carried out: to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his visit to Manila in late 1994, to kill President Clinton during a visit to the Philippines in early 1995, to bomb in midair a dozen US transpacific flights in 1995, and to set off a bomb at Los Angeles International Airport in 1999. Also plotted to carry out terrorist operations against US and Israeli tourists visiting Jordan for millennial celebrations in late 1999. (Jordanian authorities thwarted the planned attacks and put 28 suspects on trial.) In December 2001, suspected al-Qaida associate Richard Colvin Reid attempted to ignite a shoe bomb on a transatlantic flight from Paris to Miami. Attempted to shoot down an Israeli chartered plane with a surface-to-air missile as it departed the Mombasa airport in November 2002
Strengths
Al-Qaida probably has several thousand members and associates. The arrests of senior-level al-Qaida operatives have interrupted some terrorist plots. Also serves as a focal point or umbrella organization for a worldwide network that includes many Sunni Islamic extremist groups, some members of al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin.
External Aid
Al-Qaida maintains moneymaking front businesses, solicits donations from likeminded supporters, and illicitly siphons funds from donations to Muslim charitable organizations. US and international efforts to block al-Qaida funding has hampered the group's ability to obtain money.
Al-Qaida Financing
The United Nations News Center
In a 9 September 2002 press statement, The United Nations News Center had the following to say about al Qaida's finances:
Al-Qaida retains financial muscle to commit terrorism. Issuing a stern warning of the continued terrorist threat posed by Al-Qaida, the head of a United Nations expert panel today urged stricter measures against the group.
"No one should doubt that Al-Qaida continues to have sufficient resources at its disposal to carry out its operations in many areas of the world and to plan and launch further terrorist attacks," said Michael Chandler, the Chairman of the monitoring group dealing with the implementation of sanctions relating to Afghanistan. "We cannot overstate the risks posed by Al-Qaida, nor should we understate the complexity of the task of cutting off its funding."
Under Security Council resolution 1390, the group is mandated to monitor the implementation by Member States of updated sanctions against Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida organization, the Taliban and their associates. These measures require all countries to freeze the financial assets of individuals, groups or organizations on the sanctions committee list, and to continue a travel ban and arms embargo on the remaining elements of the Taliban, Al-Qaida network and its supporters.
Speaking at a press briefing at UN Headquarters in New York, Mr. Chandler cited reports of ongoing money transfers outside the formal banking system. "Islamic-based charities provide a source of funds from which Al-Qaida has and can easily continue to benefit, and many governments are reluctant to investigate charities unless they have definite evidence of an abuse of the charity's functions," he said, calling for a concerted effort to tackle the problem.
"There are growing indications of the concentration of Al-Qaida in north Africa, the Middle East, central, southern and southeast Asia," he warned. "We continue to be collectively faced by an unprecedented form of terrorism without frontiers, the members of which are quite ruthless and without principle when it comes to respecting people as humanity."
The panel has concentrated most of its efforts recent months on Europe, "a key area which Al-Qaida appears to have used for preparation to mount not only the 11 September attacks but also subsequently some smaller terrorist actions," he said.
Previewing a report which will be published in the coming days, Mr. Chandler also acknowledged that the international community had made great strides in dealing with Al-Qaida - "cutting off their economic resources, freezing assets, rounding up their operatives and preventing terrorist attacks." But while there had been victories in the war against terrorism, it had not yet been won, he said.
"There's much that still needs to be done, and there are some things that can and should be done better," Mr. Chandler said, noting that among its recommendations, the report calls for the wider use of the UN list of Taliban and Al-Qaida operatives subject to international sanctions. That list "should be maintained as the key and authoritative document, and it must contain as many of the names of members and operatives of Al-Qaida and their supporters as possible."
As for obstructions to the arms embargo, Mr. Chandler said it was "no secret that it is a business that requires much stricter controls internationally" and called on governments to impose greater penalties on those breaking the ban.
• Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)
Locations/Area of Operations
East Asia / Pacific - Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
The largest RPA/ABB groups are on the Philippine islands of Luzon, Negros, and the Visayas
Description
The ABB, the breakaway urban hit squad of the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army, was formed in the mid-1980s. The ABB was added to the Terrorist Exclusion list in December 2001.
Activities
Responsible for more than 100 murders, including the murder in 1989 of US Army Col. James Rowe in the Philippines. In March 1997, the group announced it had formed an alliance with another armed group, the Revolutionary Proletarian Army (RPA). In March 2000, the group claimed credit for a rifle grenade attack against the Department of Energy building in Manila and strafed Shell Oil offices in the central Philippines to protest rising oil prices.
Strengths
Approximately 500.
External Aid
Unknown.
• Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)
Locations/Area of Operations
Sub-Saharan Africa - Solomon Islands
Northeastern Congo.
Description
Consists of a diverse coalition of former members of the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) and Islamists from the Salaf Tabliq group. The conglomeration of fighters formed in 1995 in opposition to the government of Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. Location: Northeastern Congo.
Activities
The ADF uses the kidnapping and murder of civilians to create fear in the local population and undermine confidence in the government. The group is suspected to be responsible for dozens of bombings in public areas. The Ugandan military offensive in mid-2000 destroyed several ADF camps.
Strengths
A few hundred fighters.
External Aid
Received past funding, supplies, and training from the Government of Sudan. Some funding suspected from sympathetic Hutu groups.
• Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA) a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist Territorial Units
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Saudi Arabia
Primarily northeastern Italy and near US military installations in northern Italy.
Description
The NTA is a clandestine leftist extremist group that first appeared in Italy’s Friuli region in 1995. Adopted the class struggle ideology of the Red Brigades of the 1970s and 1980s and a similar logo -- an encircled five-point star -- for their declarations. Seeks the formation of an "anti-imperialist fighting front" with other Italian leftist terrorist groups, including Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei and the New Red Brigades. Opposes what it perceives as US and NATO imperialism and condemns Italy’s foreign and labor polices. In a leaflet dated January 2002, NTA identified experts in four Italian Government sectors -- federalism, privatizations, justice reform, and jobs and pensions -- as potential targets.
Activities
To date, NTA has conducted attacks only against property. During the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 1999, NTA members threw gasoline bombs at the Venice and Rome headquarters of the then-ruling party, Democrats of the Left. NTA claimed responsibility for a bomb attack in September 2000 against the Central European Initiative office in Trieste and a bomb attack in August 2001 against the Venice Tribunal building. In January 2002, police thwarted an attempt by four NTA members to enter the Rivolto Military Air Base. In 2003, NTA claimed responsibility for the arson attacks against three vehicles belonging to US troops serving at the Ederle and Aviano bases in Italy. There has been no reported activity by the group since the arrest in January 2004 of NTA’s founder and leader.
Strengths
Accounts vary from one to approximately 20 members. .
External Aid
None evident.
• Armed Islamic Group (GIA)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Algeria, Senegal
Algeria, Sahel (i.e. northern Mali, northern Mauritania, and northern Niger), and Europe.
Description
An Islamist extremist group, the GIA aims to overthrow the Algerian regime and replace it with a fundamentalist Islamic state. The GIA began its violent activity in 1992 after the military government suspended legislative elections in anticipation of an overwhelming victory by the Islamic Salvation Front, the largest Islamic opposition party.
.
Activities
The GIA has engaged in attacks against civilians and government workers. Starting in 1992, the GIA conducted a terrorist campaign of civilian massacres, sometimes wiping out entire villages in its area of operation, and killing tens of thousands of Algerians. GIA’s brutal attacks on civilians alienated them from the Algerian populace. Since announcing its campaign against foreigners living in Algeria in 1992, the GIA has killed more than 100 expatriate men and women, mostly Europeans, in the country. Many of the GIA’s members have joined other Islamist groups or been killed or captured by the Algerian Government. The GIA’s most recent significant attacks were in August, 2001.
Strengths
Precise numbers are unknown, but probably fewer than 100.
External Aid
The GIA has members in Europe that provide funding.
• Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR) a.k.a. Interahamwe, Former Armed Forces (ex-FAR)
Description
The FAR was the army of the Rwandan Hutu regime that carried out the genocide of 500,000 or more Tutsis and regime opponents in 1994. The Interahamwe was the civilian militia force that carried out much of the killing. The groups merged and recruited additional fighters after they were forced from Rwanda into the Democratic Republic of Congo (then-Zaire) in 1994. They are now often known as the Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALIR), which is the armed branch of the PALIR or Party for the Liberation of Rwanda.
Activities
The group seeks to topple Rwanda's Tutsi-dominated government, reinstitute Hutu-control, and, possibly, complete the genocide. In 1996, a message allegedly from the ALIR threatened to kill the US Ambassador to Rwanda and other US citizens. In 1999, ALIR guerrillas critical of alleged US-UK support for the Rwandan regime kidnapped and killed eight foreign tourists including two US citizens in a game park on the Congo-Uganda border. In the current Congolese war, the ALIR is allied with Kinshasa against the Rwandan invaders.
Strength
Several thousand ALIR regular forces operate alongside the Congolese army on the front lines of the Congo civil war, while a like number of ALIR guerrillas operate behind Rwanda lines in eastern Congo closer to the Rwandan border and sometimes within Rwanda.
Location/Area of Operation
Mostly Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda, but some operations in Burundi.
External Support
The Democratic Republic of the Congo provides ALIR forces in Congo with training, arms, and supplies.
• Asbat al-Ansar
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Lebanon
The group’s primary base of operations is the ‘Ayn al-Hilwah Palestinian refugee camp near Sidon in southern Lebanon.
Description
Asbat al-Ansar, the League of the Followers or Partisans’ League, is a Lebanon-based Sunni extremist group, composed primarily of Palestinians with links to Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida organization and other Sunni extremist groups. The group follows an extremist interpretation of Islam that justifies violence against civilian targets to achieve political ends. Some of the group’s goals include overthrowing the Lebanese Government and thwarting perceived anti-Islamic and pro-Western influences in the country.
Activities
Asbat al-Ansar has carried out multiple terrorist attacks in Lebanon since it first emerged in the early 1990s. The group assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores in the mid1990s. The group raised its operational profile in 2000 with two attacks against Lebanese and international targets. It was involved in clashes in northern Lebanon in December 1999 and carried out a rocket-propelled grenade attack on the Russian Embassy in Beirut in January 2000. Asbat al-Ansar’s leader, Abu Muhjin, remains at large despite being sentenced to death in absentia for the 1994 murder of a Muslim cleric. Suspected Asbat al-Ansar elements were responsible for an attempt in April 2003 to use a car bomb against a McDonald’s in a Beirut suburb. By October, Lebanese security forces arrested Ibn al-Shahid, who is believed to be associated with Asbat al-Ansar, and charged him with masterminding the bombing of three fast food restaurants in 2002 and the attempted attack on a McDonald’s in 2003. Asbat forces were involved in other violence in Lebanon in 2003, including clashes with members of Yassir Arafat’s Fatah movement in the ‘Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp and a rocket attack in June on the Future TV building in Beirut. In 2004, no successful terrorist attacks were attributed to Asbat al-Ansar. However, in September, operatives with links to the group were believed to be involved in a planned terrorist operation targeting the Italian Embassy, the Ukrainian Consulate General, and Lebanese Government offices. The plot, which reportedly also involved other Lebanese Sunni extremists, was thwarted by Italian, Lebanese, and Syrian security agencies. In 2004, Asbat al-Ansar remained vocal in its condemnation of the United States’ presence in Iraq, and in April the group urged Iraqi insurgents to kill US and other hostages to avenge the death of HAMAS leaders Abdul Aziz Rantisi and Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. In October, Mahir al-Sa’di, a member of Asbat al-Ansar, was sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for plotting to assassinate former US Ambassador to Lebanon David Satterfield in 2000. Until his death in March 2003, al-Sa’di worked in cooperation with Abu Muhammad al-Masri, the head of al-Qa’ida at the ‘Ayn al-Hilwah refugee camp, where fighting has occurred between Asbat al-Ansar and Fatah elements.
Strengths
The group commands about 300 fighters in Lebanon
External Aid
Probably receives money through international Sunni extremist networks and possibly Usama Bin Ladin’s al-Qa’ida network.
• Aum Shinrikyo, Aum Supreme Truth (Aum)
Locations/Area of Operations
East Asia / Pacific - Saudi Arabia
The Aum’s principal membership is located in Japan, but a residual branch comprising about 300 followers has surfaced in Russia.
Description
A cult established in 1987 by Shoko Asahara, the Aum aimed to take over Japan and then the world. Approved as a religious entity in 1989 under Japanese law, the group ran candidates in a Japanese parliamentary election in 1990. Over time, the cult began to emphasize the imminence of the end of the world and stated that the United States would initiate Armageddon by starting World War III with Japan. The Japanese Government revoked its recognition of the Aum as a religious organization in October 1995, but in 1997 a Government panel decided not to invoke the Anti-Subversive Law against the group, which would have outlawed it. A 1999 law continues to give the Japanese Government authorization to maintain police surveillance of the group due to concerns that the Aum might launch future terrorist attacks. Under the leadership of Fumihiro Joyu, the Aum changed its name to Aleph in January 2000 and tried to distance itself from the violent and apocalyptic teachings of its founder. However, in late 2003, Joyu stepped down, pressured by members who wanted to return fully to the worship of Asahara.
Activities
On March 20, 1995, Aum members simultaneously released the chemical nerve agent sarin on several Tokyo subway trains, killing 12 persons and injuring up to 1,500. The group was responsible for other mysterious events involving chemical incidents in Japan in 1994. Its efforts to conduct attacks using biological agents have been unsuccessful. Japanese police arrested Asahara in May 1995, and authorities sentenced him in February 2004 to death for his role in the attacks of 1995. Since 1997, the cult has continued to recruit new members, engage in commercial enterprise, and acquire property, although it scaled back these activities significantly in 2001 in response to public outcry. In July 2001, Russian authorities arrested a group of Russian Aum followers who had planned to set off bombs near the Imperial Palace in Tokyo as part of an operation to free Asahara from jail and smuggle him to Russia.
Strengths
The Aum’s current membership in Japan is estimated to be about 1,650 persons. At the time of the Tokyo subway attack, the group claimed to have 9,000 members in Japan and as many as 40,000 worldwide.
External Aid
None.
• Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - France, Portugal
Operates primarily in the Basque autonomous regions of northern Spain and southwestern France, but also has attacked Spanish and French interests elsewhere.
Description
ETA was founded in 1959 with the aim of establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist principles and encompassing the Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, and Alava, as well as the autonomous region of Navarra and the southwestern French Departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and Soule. Spanish and French counterterrorism initiatives since 2000 have hampered the group’s operational capabilities. Spanish police arrested scores of ETA members and accomplices in Spain in 2004, and dozens were apprehended in France, including two key group leaders. These arrests included the capture in October of two key ETA leaders in southwestern France. ETA’s political wing, Batasuna, remains banned in Spain. Spanish and French prisons are estimated to hold over 700 ETA members.
a.k.a. Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna, Batasuna
Activities
Primarily involved in bombings and assassinations of Spanish Government officials, security and military forces, politicians, and judicial figures, but has also targeted journalists and tourist areas. Security service scrutiny and a public outcry after the Islamic extremist train bombing on March 11, 2004, in Madrid limited ETA’s capabilities and willingness to inflict casualties. ETA conducted no fatal attacks in 2004, but did mount several low-level bombings in Spanish tourist areas during the summer and 11 bombings in early December, each preceded by a warning call. The group has killed more than 850 persons and injured hundreds of others since it began lethal attacks in the 1960s. ETA finances its activities primarily through extortion and robbery. Strength
Strengths
Unknown; hundreds of members plus supporters.
External Aid
Has received training at various times in the past in Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua. Some ETA members allegedly fled to Cuba and Mexico while others reside in South America. ETA members have operated and been arrested in other European countries, including Belgium, The Netherlands, and Germany.
• Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF) a.k.a. Cholana Kangtoap Serei Cheat Kampouchea
Locations/Area of Operations
East Asia / Pacific - Singapore
Northeastern Cambodia near the Thai border, and the United States. .
Description
The Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF) emerged in November 1998 in the wake of political violence that saw many influential Cambodian leaders flee and the Cambodian People’s Party assume power. With an avowed aim of overthrowing the Government, the group is led by a Cambodian-American, a former member of the opposition Sam Rainsy Party. The CFF’s membership reportedly includes Cambodian-Americans based in Thailand and the United States, and former soldiers from the Khmer Rouge, Royal Cambodian Armed Forces, and various political factions.
Activities
The Cambodian Government arrested seven CFF members who were reportedly planning an unspecified terrorist attack in southwestern Cambodia in late 2003, but there were no successful CFF attacks that year. Cambodian courts in February and March 2002 prosecuted 38 CFF members suspected of staging an attack in Cambodia in 2000. The courts convicted 19 members, including one US citizen, of "terrorism" and/or "membership in an armed group" and sentenced them to terms of five years to life imprisonment. The group claimed responsibility for an attack in late November 2000 on several Government installations that killed at least eight persons and wounded more than a dozen. In April 1999, five CFF members were arrested for plotting to blow up a fuel depot outside Phnom Penh with anti-tank weapons.
Strengths
Exact strength is unknown, but totals probably never have exceeded 100 armed fighters.
External Aid
US-based leadership collects funds from the Cambodian-American community.
• Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Saudi Arabia
Northern Ireland, Irish Republic. Does not have an established presence in Great Britain.
Description
CIRA is a terrorist splinter group formed in the mid 1990s as the clandestine armed wing of Republican Sinn Fein, which split from Sinn Fein in 1986. "Continuity" refers to the group’s belief that it is carrying on the original Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) goal of forcing the British out of Northern Ireland. CIRA’s aliases, Continuity Army Council and Republican Sinn Fein, were also designated as FTOs. CIRA cooperates with the larger Real IRA.
Activities
CIRA has been active in Belfast and the border areas of Northern Ireland, where it has carried out bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, extortion, and robberies. On occasion, it has provided advance warning to police of its attacks. Targets include British military, Northern Ireland security forces, and Loyalist paramilitary groups. Unlike the Provisional IRA, CIRA is not observing a cease-fire. CIRA has continued its activities with a series of hoax bomb threats, low-level improvised explosive device attacks, kidnapping, intimidation, and so-called "punishment beatings."
Strengths
Membership is small, with possibly fewer than 50 hardcore activists. Police counterterrorist operations have reduced the group’s strength, but CIRA continues to recruit, train, and plan operations.
External Aid
Suspected of receiving funds and arms from sympathizers in the United States. May have acquired arms and materiel from the Balkans in cooperation with the Real IRA.
• Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Qatar
Xinjiang Province and neighboring countries in the region.
Description
The East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a small Islamic extremist group based in China’s western Xinjiang Province. It is the most militant of the ethnic Uighur separatist groups pursuing an independent "Eastern Turkistan," an area that would include Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region of China. ETIM is linked to al-Qa’ida and the international mujahedin movement. In September 2002 the group was designated under EO 13224 as a supporter of terrorist activity.
Activities
ETIM militants fought alongside al-Qa’ida and Taliban forces in Afghanistan during Operation Enduring Freedom. In October 2003, Pakistani soldiers killed ETIM leader Hassan Makhsum during raids on al-Qa’ida–associated compounds in western Pakistan. US and Chinese Government information suggests ETIM is responsible for various terrorist acts inside and outside China. In May 2002, two ETIM members were deported to China from Kyrgyzstan for plotting to attack the US Embassy in Kyrgyzstan as well as other US interests abroad.
Strengths
Unknown. Only a small minority of ethnic Uighurs supports the Xinjiang independence movement or the formation of an Eastern Turkistan.
External Aid
ETIM has received training and financial assistance from al-Qa’ida.
• First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO) Grupo de Resistencia Anti-Fascista Primero de Octubre
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Portugal
Spain.
Description
GRAPO was formed in 1975 as the armed wing of the illegal Communist Party of Spain during the Franco era. Advocates the overthrow of the Spanish Government and its replacement with a
Marxist-Leninist regime. GRAPO is vehemently anti-American, seeks the removal of all US military forces from Spanish territory, and has conducted and attempted several attacks against US targets since 1977. The group issued a communiqué following the September 11, 2001, attacks in the United States, expressing its satisfaction that "symbols of imperialist power" were decimated and affirming that "the war" has only just begun. Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.
Activities
GRAPO did not mount a successful terrorist operation in 2004, marking the third consecutive year without an attack. The group suffered more setbacks in 2004, with several members and sympathizers arrested and sentences upheld or handed down in April in the appellate case for GRAPO militants arrested in Paris in 2000. GRAPO has killed more than 90 persons and injured more than 200 since its formation. The group’s operations traditionally have been designed to cause material damage and gain publicity rather than inflict casualties, but the terrorists have conducted lethal bombings and close-range assassinations.
Strengths
Fewer than two dozen activists remain. Police have made periodic large-scale arrests of GRAPO members, crippling the organization and forcing it into lengthy rebuilding periods. In 2002, Spanish and French authorities arrested 22 suspected members, including some of the group’s reconstituted leadership. More members were arrested throughout 2003 and 2004.
External Aid
None.
• FRONTE DI LIBERAZIONE NAZIUNALE DI A CORSICA (FLNC)
Mothertongue Name: Fronte di Liberazione Naziunale di a Corsica (FLNC)
Aliases: Front de Liberation Nationale de la Corse , National Liberation Front of Corsica
Base of Operation: Corsica; France
Founding Philosophy: The merger of two Corsican terrorist organizations: Ghjustizia Paolina and the Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione in 1976 resulted in the establishment of the FLNC and thousands of bombings in the 1970s and 1980s. The group was to split again, however, at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s due to political rivalry. The initial split into a 'canal historique' (historic channel) and the 'canal habituel' (usual channel) was followed by a further fracturing into a number of additional terrorist organizations: Resistenza, Fronte Ribellu, Front Arme Revolutionnaire Corse, etc. Some of the groups had only a brief existence, but others went on to later merge with each other or newer groups. Until the FLNC-canal habituel decided to end its activities in 1997, it and the FLNC-canal historique were considered the most important terrorist organizations in Corsica. The canal historique expanded its operations to include mainland France in 1996, targeting a series of senior government officials. They succeeded in assassinating Claude Erignac, the prefect of Corsica and the most senior representative of the French government on the island.
In 1999, yet another merger between the FLNC-canal historique and other smaller organizations resulted in the re-adoption of the name 'FLNC.' In December 1999, the FLNC declared a ceasefire. The three month ceasefire was eventually extended indefinitely and technically still exists; however, the conflict flared up again in 2000 with a series of bombings stemming from rivalries between the various separatist groups. The group is not considered to have a well-established ideology, although it generally supports leftist ideas and once claimed it was fighting the 'internal colonialism' of France. Women are not allowed to be members of the organization.
Current Goals: The FLNC ultimately hopes to achieve self-determination for Corsica through independence and to preserve Corsican language and culture. In addition, the group would like for terrorist group members imprisoned in continental France to be moved to a Corsican prison or allowed amnesty. The group also wants for Corsica to become a tax-free zone in order to attract transnational companies. An influx of North African immigrants has led to some racist violence and discrimination; the FLNC has begun to advocate preferential treatment for Corsicans in the job market (over North Africans).
French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin was the first leader to engage in talks with the Corsicans and negotiated the 1999 ceasefire. In July 2000, he proposed that the island be allowed some elements of self-rule including local legislation and the ability to teach the local dialect in schools. In July of 2003, however, Corsicans narrowly rejected a French offer for greater autonomy from France in a referendum. In a 51% to 49% vote, Corsicans voted no on a plan to create a single regional assembly with the power to levy taxes and to hold greater control over public services.
• HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Israel, Lebanon, Slovenia
HAMAS currently limits its terrorist operations to Israeli military and civilian targets in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. Two of the group’s most senior leaders in the Gaza Strip, Shaykh Ahmad Yasin and Abd al Aziz al Rantisi, were killed in Israeli air strikes in 2004. The group retains a cadre of senior leaders spread throughout the Gaza Strip, Syria, Lebanon, Iran, and the Gulf States.
Description
HAMAS was formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS elements have used both violent and political means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in Israel. It is loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others operating openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. HAMAS’ strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.
Activities
HAMAS terrorists, especially those in the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian and military targets. HAMAS maintained the pace of its operational activity in 2004, claiming numerous attacks against Israeli interests. HAMAS has not yet directly targeted US interests, although the group makes little or no effort to avoid targets frequented by foreigners. HAMAS continues to confine its attacks to Israelis inside Israel and the occupied territories.
Strengths
Unknown number of official members; tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers.
External Aid
Receives some funding from Iran but primarily relies on donations from Palestinian expatriates around the world and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda activity take place in Western Europe and North America.
• Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B) (Movement of Islamic Holy War)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Seychelles
The group operates and trains members in Bangladesh, where it maintains at least six camps.
Description
The mission of HUJI-B, led by Shauqat Osman, is to establish Islamic rule in Bangladesh. HUJI-B has connections to the Pakistani militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI) and Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM), which advocate similar objectives in Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir. These groups all maintain contacts with the al-Qa’ida network in Afghanistan. The leaders of HUJIB and HUM both signed the February 1998 fatwa sponsored by Usama bin Ladin that declared American civilians to be legitimate targets for attack.
Activities
HUJI-B was accused of stabbing a senior Bangladeshi journalist in November 2000 for making a documentary on the plight of Hindus in Bangladesh. HUJI-B was suspected in the assassination attempt in July 2000 of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. The group may also have been responsible for indiscriminate attacks using improvised explosive devices against cultural gatherings in Dhaka in January and April 2001.
Strengths
Unknown; some estimates of HUJI-B cadre strength suggest several thousand members.
External Aid
Funding of the HUJI-B comes primarily from madrassas in Bangladesh. The group also has ties to militants in Pakistan that may provide another funding source.
• Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM) (Movement of Holy Warriors)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Afghanistan, India, Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
Based in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi, and several other towns in Pakistan, but members conduct insurgent and terrorist activities primarily in Kashmir. HUM trained its militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Description
HUM is an Islamist militant group based in Pakistan that operates primarily in Kashmir. It is politically aligned with the radical political party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam’s Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). The long-time leader of the group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in mid-February 2000 stepped down as HUM emir, turning the reins over to the popular Kashmiri commander and his second-in-com-mand, Farooqi Kashmiri. Khalil, who has been linked to Usama Bin Ladin and signed his fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks on US and Western interests, assumed the position of HUM Secretary General. HUM operated terrorist training camps in eastern Afghanistan until Coalition air strikes destroyed them during fall 2001. Khalil was detained by the Pakistanis in mid-2004 and subsequently released in late December. In 2003, HUM began using the name Jamiat ul-Ansar (JUA), and Pakistan banned JUA in November 2003.
Activities
Has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Kashmir. Linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August 1995, and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year. HUM was responsible for the hijacking of an Indian airliner on December 24, 1999, which resulted in the release of Masood Azhar. Azhar, an important leader in the former Harakat ul-Ansar, was imprisoned by the Indians in 1994 and founded Jaish-e-Muhammad after his release. Also released in 1999 was Ahmed Omar Sheik, who was convicted of the abduc-tion/murder in January-February 2002 of US journalist Daniel Pearl.
Strengths
Has several hundred armed supporters located in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, and India’s southern Kashmir and Doda regions and in the Kashmir valley. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris and also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war. Uses light and heavy machineguns, assault rifles, mortars, explosives, and rockets. HUM lost a significant share of its membership in defections to the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) in 2000.
External Aid
Collects donations from Saudi Arabia, other Gulf and Islamic states, Pakistanis and Kashmiris. HUM’s financial collection methods also include soliciting donations in magazine ads and pamphlets. The sources and amount of HUM’s military funding are unknown. In anticipation of asset seizures in 2001 by the Pakistani Government, the HUM withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods. Its fundraising in Pakistan has been constrained since the Government clampdown on extremist groups and freezing of terrorist assets.
• Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI) (Movement of Islamic Holy War)
Description
HUJI, a Sunni extremist group that follows the Deobandi tradition of Islam, was founded in 1980 in Afghanistan to fight in the jihad against the Soviets. It is also affiliated with the Jamiat Ulema-I-Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F) and the Deobandi school of Sunni Islam. The group, led by chief commander Amin Rabbani, is made up primarily of Pakistanis and foreign Islamists who are fighting for the liberation of Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan.
Activities
Has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Kashmir. Linked to the Kashmiri militant group al-Faran that kidnapped five Western tourists in Kashmir in July 1995; one was killed in August 1995 and the other four reportedly were killed in December of the same year.
Strength
Exact numbers are unknown, but there may be several hundred members in Kashmir.
Location/Area of Operation
Pakistan and Kashmir. Trained members in Afghanistan until fall of 2001.
External Aid
Specific sources of external aid are unknown.
• Hizb ul-Mujahidin (HM)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan.
Description
Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM), the largest Kashmiri militant group, was founded in 1989 and officially supports the liberation of Jammu and Kashmir and its accession to Pakistan, although some cadres favor independence. The group is the militant wing of Pakistan’s largest Islamic political party, the Jamaat-i-Islami, and targets Indian security forces,politicians and civilians in Jammu and Kashmir. It reportedly operated in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s and trained with the Afghan Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) in Afghanistan until the Taliban takeover. The group, led by Syed Salahuddin, is comprised primarily of ethnic Kashmiris.
Activities
HM has conducted a number of operations against Indian military targets in Jammu and Kashmir. The group also occasionally strikes at civilian targets, but has not engaged in terrorist acts outside India. HM claimed responsibility for numerous attacks within Kashmir in 2004. .
Strengths
Exact numbers are unknown, but estimates range from several hundred to possibly as many as 1,000 members in Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan.
External Aid
Specific sources of external aid are unknown
• Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Afghanistan, Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
Eastern Afghanistan (particularly Konar and Nurestan Provinces) and adjacent areas of Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Description
Gulbuddin Hikmatyar founded Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG) as a faction of the Hizb-I Islami party in 1977, and it was one of the major mujahedin groups in the war against the Soviets. HIG has long-established links with Usama Bin Ladin. In the early 1990s, Hikmatyar ran several terrorist training camps in Afghanistan and was a pioneer in sending mercenary fighters to other Islamic conflicts. Hikmatyar offered to shelter Bin Ladin after the latter fled Sudan in 1996. In a late 2004 press release, Hikmatyar reiterated his commitment to fight US and Coalition forces.
Activities
HIG has staged small attacks in its attempt to force US troops to withdraw from Afghanistan, overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration, and establish an Islamic fundamentalist state. In 2004, several US soldiers were killed in attacks in Konar, Afghanistan, the area in which HIG is most active.
Strengths
Unknown, but possibly could have hundreds of veteran fighters on which to call.
External Aid
Unknown.
• Hizballah (Party of God, Islamic Jihad, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Russia
Operates in the southern suburbs of Beirut, the Beka’a Valley, and southern Lebanon. Has established cells in Europe, Africa, South America, North America, and Asia.
Description
Formed in 1982 in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, this Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini. The Majlis al-Shura, or Consultative Council, is the group’s highest governing body and is led by Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah. Hizballah is dedicated to liberating Jerusalem and eliminating Israel, and has formally advocated ultimate establishment of Islamic rule in Lebanon. Nonetheless, Hizballah has actively participated in Lebanon’s political system since 1992. Hizballah is closely allied with, and often directed by, Iran but has the capability and willingness to act independently. Though Hizballah does not share the Syrian regime’s secular orientation, the group has been a strong ally in helping Syria advance its political objectives in the region.
Activities
Known or suspected to have been involved in numerous anti-US and anti-Israeli terrorist attacks, including the suicide truck bombings of the US Embassy and US Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the US Embassy annex in Beirut in 1984. Three members of Hizballah, ‘Imad Mughniyah, Hasan Izz-al-Din, and Ali Atwa, are on the FBI’s list of 22 Most Wanted Terrorists for the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847 during which a US Navy diver was murdered. Elements of the group were responsible for the kidnapping and detention of Americans and other Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s. Hizballah also attacked the Israeli Embassy in Argentina in 1992 and the Israeli cultural center in Buenos Aires in 1994. In 2000, Hizballah operatives captured three Israeli soldiers in the Shab’a Farms and kidnapped an Israeli noncombatant. Hizballah also provides guidance and financial and operational support for Palestinian extremist groups engaged in terrorist operations in Israel and the occupied territories. In 2004, Hizballah launched an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that left Lebanese airspace and flew over the Israeli town of Nahariya before crashing into Lebanese territorial waters. Ten days prior to the event, the Hizballah Secretary General said Hizballah would come up with new measures to counter Israeli Air Force violations of Lebanese airspace. Hizballah also continued launching small scale attacks across the Israeli border, resulting in the deaths of several Israeli soldiers. In March 2004, Hizballah and HAMAS signed an agreement to increase joint efforts to perpetrate attacks against Israel. In late 2004, Hizballah’s al-Manar television station, based in Beirut with an estimated ten million viewers worldwide, was prohibited from broadcasting in France. Al-Manar was placed on the Terrorist Exclusion List (TEL) in the United States, which led to its removal from the program offerings of its main cable service provider, and made it more difficult for al-Manar associates and affiliates to operate in the United States.
Strengths
Several thousand supporters and a few hundred terrorist operatives.
External Aid
Receives financial, training, weapons, explosives, political, diplomatic, and organizational aid from Iran, and diplomatic, political, and logistical support from Syria. Hizballah also receives funding from charitable donations and business interests.
• Irish Republican Army (IRA) a.k.a. Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), the Provos (Sometimes referred to as the PIRA to distinguish it from RIRA and CIRA.)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Saudi Arabia
Northern Ireland, Irish Republic, Great Britain, and Europe.
Description
Formed in 1969 as the clandestine armed wing of the political movement Sinn Fein, the IRA is devoted both to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and to unifying Ireland. The IRA conducted attacks until its cease-fire in 1997 and agreed to disarm as a part of the 1998 Belfast Agreement, which established the basis for peace in Northern Ireland. Dissension within the IRA over support for the Northern Ireland peace process resulted in the formation of two more radical splinter groups: Continuity IRA (CIRA), and the Real IRA (RIRA) in mid to late 1990s. The IRA, sometimes referred to as the PIRA to distinguish it from RIRA and CIRA, is organized into small, tightly-knit cells under the leadership of the Army Council.
Activities
Traditional IRA activities have included bombings, assassinations, kidnappings, punishment beatings, extortion, smuggling, and robberies. Before the cease-fire in 1997, the group had conducted bombing campaigns on various targets in Northern Ireland and Great Britain, including senior British Government officials, civilians, police, and British military targets. The group’s refusal in late 2004 to allow photographic documentation of its decommissioning process was an obstacle to progress in implementing the Belfast Agreement and stalled talks. The group previously had disposed of light, medium, and heavy weapons, ammunition, and explosives in three rounds of decommissioning. However, the IRA is believed to retain the ability to conduct paramilitary operations. The group’s extensive criminal activities reportedly provide the IRA and the political party Sinn Fein with millions of dollars each year; the IRA was implicated in two significant robberies in 2004, one involving almost $50 million.
Strengths
Several hundred members and several thousand sympathizers despite the defection of some members to RIRA and CIRA.
External Aid
In the past, the IRA has received aid from a variety of groups and countries and considerable training and arms from Libya and the PLO. Is suspected of receiving funds, arms, and other terrorist-related materiel from sympathizers in the United States. Similarities in operations suggest links to ETA and the FARC. In August 2002, three suspected IRA members were arrested in Colombia on charges of helping the FARC improve its explosives capabilities.
• Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) a.k.a. Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA)
Description
The Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) emerged publicly in mid-1998 when the group released a series of communiqués that expressed support for Usama Bin Ladin, appealed for the overthrow of the Yemeni Government and the commencement of operations against US and other Western interests in Yemen.
Activities
Engages in bombings and kidnappings to promote its goals. Kidnapped 16 British, Australian, and US tourists in late December 1998 near Mudiyah in southern Yemen. Since the capture and trial of the Mudiyah kidnappers and the execution in October 1999 of the group’s leader, Zein al-Abidine al-Mihdar (a.k.a. Abu Hassan), individuals associated with the IAA have remained involved in terrorist activities. In 2001 the Yemeni Government convicted an IAA member and three associates for their roles in the October 2000 bombing of the British Embassy in Sanaa.
Strength
Not known.
Location/Area of Operation
Operates in the southern governorates of Yemen—primarily Aden and Abyan.
External Aid
Not known.
• Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Azerbaijan, Georgia, Qatar, Turkey
Primarily in Russia and adjacent areas of the north Caucasus, particularly in the mountainous south of Chechnya, with major logistical activities in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.
Description
The IIPB is a terrorist group affiliated with the Chechen separatist movement demanding a single Islamic state in the North Caucasus. Chechen extremist leader Shamil Basayev established the IIPB -- consisting of Chechens, Arabs, and other foreign fighters -- in 1998, which he led with Saudi-born mujahedin leader Ibn al-Khattab until the latter’s death in March 2002. The IIPB was one of three groups affiliated with Chechen guerrillas that seized Moscow’s Dubrovka Theater and took more than 700 hostages in October 2002. While this group has not been identified as conducting attacks since their designation two years ago, those Arab mujahedin still operating in Chechnya now fall under the command of Abu Hafs al-Urduni, who assumed the leadership in April 2004 after the death of Khattab’s successor, Abu al-Walid. Designated under EO 13224 in February 2003.
Activities
Involved in terrorist and guerilla operations against Russian forces, pro-Russian Chechen forces, and Chechen non-combatants.
Strengths
Up to 400 fighters, including as many as 100 Arabs and other foreign fighters.
External Aid
The IIPB and its Arab leaders appear to be a primary conduit for Islamic funding of the Chechen guerrillas, in part through links to al-Qa’ida-related financiers on the Arabian Peninsula.
• Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Romania, Tajikistan
Militants are scattered throughout South Asia and Tajikistan. Area of operations includes Afghanistan, Iran, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
Description
The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is a group of Islamic militants from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states. The IMU is closely affiliated with al-Qa’ida and, under the leadership of Tohir Yoldashev, has embraced Usama Bin Ladin’s anti-US, anti-Western agenda. The IMU also remains committed to its original goals of overthrowing Uzbekistani President Karimov and establishing an Islamic state in Uzbekistan.
Activities
The IMU in recent years has participated in attacks on US and Coalition soldiers in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and plotted attacks on US diplomatic facilities in Central Asia. In November 2004, the IMU was blamed for an explosion in the southern Kyrgyzstani city of Osh that killed one police officer and one terrorist. In May 2003, Kyrgyzstani security forces disrupted an IMU cell that was seeking to bomb the US Embassy and a nearby hotel in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan. The IMU was also responsible for explosions in Bishkek in December 2002 and Osh in May 2003 that killed eight people. The IMU primarily targeted Uzbekistani interests before October 2001 and is believed to have been responsible for five car bombs in Tashkent in February 1999. IMU militants also took foreigners hostage in 1999 and 2000, including four US citizens who were mountain climbing in August 2000 and four Japanese geologists and eight Kyrgyzstani soldiers in August 1999.
Strengths
Probably fewer than 500.
External Aid
The IMU receives support from other Islamic extremist groups and patrons in the Middle East and Central and South Asia.
• Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM) (Army of MohammedTehrik ul-Furqaan, Khuddam-ul-Islam )
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - India, Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
Pakistan. JEM maintained training camps in Afghanistan until the fall of 2001.
Description
The Jaish-e-Mohammed is an Islamic extremist group based in Pakistan that was formed in early 2000 by Masood Azhar upon his release from prison in India. The group’s aim is to unite Kashmir with Pakistan. It is politically aligned with the radical political party Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam’s Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). By 2003, JEM had splintered into Khuddam ul-Islam (KUI), headed by Azhar, and Jamaat ul-Furqan (JUF), led by Abdul Jabbar, who was released in August 2004 from Pakistani custody after being detained for suspected involvement in the December 2003 assassination attempts against President Musharraf. Pakistan banned KUI and JUF in November 2003. Elements of JEM and Lashkar e-Tayyiba combined with other groups to mount attacks as "The Save Kashmir Movement."
Activities
The JEM’s leader, Masood Azhar, was released from Indian imprisonment in December 1999 in exchange for 155 hijacked Indian Airlines hostages. The Harakat-ul-Ansar (HUA) kidnappings in 1994 of US and British nationals by Omar Sheik in New Delhi and the HUA/al-Faran kidnappings in July 1995 of Westerners in Kashmir were two of several previous HUA efforts to free Azhar. On October 1, 2001, JEM claimed responsibility for a suicide attack on the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly building in Srinagar that killed at least 31 persons but later denied the claim. The Indian Government has publicly implicated JEM, along with Lashkar e-Tayyiba, for the December 13, 2001, attack on the Indian Parliament that killed nine and injured 18. Pakistani authorities suspect that perpetrators of fatal anti-Christian attacks in Islamabad, Murree, and Taxila during 2002 were affiliated with JEM. The Pakistanis have implicated elements of JEM in the assassination attempts against President Musharraf in December 2003.
Strengths
Has several hundred armed supporters located in Pakistan and in India’s southern Kashmir and Doda regions and in the Kashmir valley, including a large cadre of former HUM members. Supporters are mostly Pakistanis and Kashmiris and also include Afghans and Arab veterans of the Afghan war.
External Aid
Most of JEM’s cadre and material resources have been drawn from the militant groups Harakat ul-Jihad-i-Islami (HUJI) and the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM). JEM had close ties to Afghan Arabs and the Taliban. Usama bin Ladin is suspected of giving funding to JEM. JEM also collects funds through donation requests in magazines and pamphlets. In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, JEM withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods.
• Jamiat ul-Mujahidin (JUM)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
Jammu and Kashmir and Pakistan.
Description
The JUM is a small, pro-Pakistan militant group formed in Jammu and Kashmir in 1990. Followers are mostly Kashmiris, but the group includes some Pakistanis.
Activities
Has conducted a number of operations against Indian military and political targets in Jammu and Kashmir, including two grenade attacks against political targets in 2004.
Strengths
Unknown.
External Aid
Unknown.
• Japanese Red Army (JRA) a.k.a. Anti-Imperialist International Brigade (AIIB)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Russia
Location unknown, but possibly in Asia and/or Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon.
Description
The JRA is an international terrorist group formed around 1970 after breaking away from the Japanese Communist League–Red Army Faction. The JRA’s historical goal has been to overthrow the Japanese Government and monarchy and to help foment world revolution. JRA’s leader, Fusako Shigenobu, claimed that the forefront of the battle against international imperialism was in Palestine, so in the early 1970s she led her small group to the Middle East to support the Palestinian struggle against Israel and the West. After her arrest in November 2000, Shigenobu announced she intended to pursue her goals using a legitimate political party rather than revolutionary violence, and the group announced it would disband in April 2001.
Activities
During the 1970s, JRA carried out a series of attacks around the world, including the massacre in 1972 at Lod Airport in Israel, two Japanese airliner hijackings, and an attempted takeover of the US Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. During the late 1980s, JRA began to single out American targets and used car bombs and rockets in attempted attacks on US Embassies in Jakarta, Rome, and Madrid. In April 1988, JRA operative Yu Kikumura was arrested with explosives on the New Jersey Turnpike, apparently planning an attack to coincide with the bombing of a USO club in Naples, a suspected JRA operation that killed five, including a US servicewoman. He was convicted of the charges and is serving a lengthy prison sentence in the United States. Tsutomu Shirosaki, captured in 1996, is also jailed in the United States. In 2000, Lebanon deported to Japan four members it arrested in 1997, but granted a fifth operative, Kozo Okamoto, political asylum. Longtime leader Shigenobu was arrested in November 2000 and faces charges of terrorism and passport fraud. Four JRA members remain in North Korea following their involvement in a hijacking in 1970; five of their family members returned to Japan in 2004.
Strengths
About six hard-core members; undetermined number of sympathizers. At its peak, the group claimed to have 30 to 40 members.
External Aid
Unknown.
• Jemaah Islamiya (JI)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia
Following the regional crackdown against JI, it is unclear how the network has responded. The JI is believed to have cells spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and southern Thailand and may have some presence in neighboring countries.
Description
Jemaah Islamiya is a Southeast Asian terrorist network with links to al-Qaida. The network plotted in secrecy through the late 1990s, following the stated goal of creating an idealized Islamic state comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the southern Philippines, and southern Thailand. Location: Following the regional crackdown against JI, it is unclear how the network has responded. The JI is believed to have cells spanning Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and southern Thailand and may have some presence in neighboring countries.
Activities
The JI was responsible for the Bali bombings on 12 October 2002, which killed nearly 200 and wounded 300 others. The Bali plot was apparently the final outcome of meetings in early 2002 in Thailand, where attacks against Singapore and soft targets such as tourist spots in the region were considered. In December 2001, Singapore authorities uncovered a JI plot to attack the US and Israeli Embassies and British and Australian diplomatic buildings in Singapore. Recent investigations also linked the JI to December 2000 bombings where dozens of bombs were detonated in Indonesia and the Philippines.
Strengths
Exact numbers are currently unknown, and Southeast Asian authorities continue to uncover and arrest additional JI elements. Singaporean officials have estimated total JI members to be approximately 5,000. The number of actual operationally oriented JI members probably is several hundred.
External Aid
Based on information from ongoing investigations, in addition to raising its own funds, the JI receives money and logistic assistance from Middle Eastern and South Asian contacts, NGOs, and other groups, including al-Qaida.
• Kahane Chai (Kach)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Israel, Slovenia
Israel and West Bank settlements, particularly Qiryat Arba’ in Hebron.
Description
Kach’s stated goal is to restore the biblical state of Israel. Kach, founded by radical Israeli-American rabbi Meir Kahane, and its offshoot Kahane Chai, (translation: "Kahane Lives"), founded by Meir Kahane’s son Binyamin following his father’s 1990 assassination in the United States, were declared to be terrorist organizations in 1994 by the Israeli Cabinet under its 1948 Terrorism Law. This followed the groups’ statements in support of Dr. Baruch Goldstein’s attack in February 1994 on the al-Ibrahimi Mosque (Goldstein was affiliated with Kach) and their verbal attacks on the Israeli Government. Palestinian gunmen killed Binyamin Kahane and his wife in a drive-by shooting in December 2000 in the West Bank.
Activities
The group has organized protests against the Israeli Government. Kach has harassed and threatened Arabs, Palestinians, and Israeli Government officials, and has vowed revenge for the death of Binyamin Kahane and his wife. Kach is suspected of involvement in a number of low-level attacks since the start of the al-Aqsa intifadah in 2000. Known Kach sympathizers are becoming more vocal and active against the planned Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in mid-2005.
Strengths
Unknown.
External Aid
Receives support from sympathizers in the United States and Europe.
• Kongra-Gel (KGK) (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK, Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress, KADEK, Kurdistan People’s Congress, Freedom and Democracy )
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Qatar
Operates primarily in Turkey, Iraq, Europe, and the Middle East.
Description
The Kongra-Gel was founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization and formally named the Kurdistan Workers? Party in 1978. The group, composed primarily of Turkish Kurds, began its campaign of armed violence in 1984, which has resulted in some 30,000 casualties. The PKK?s goal has been to establish an independent, democratic Kurdish state in southeast Turkey, northern Iraq, and parts of Iran and Syria. In the early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. Turkish authorities captured Ocalan in Kenya in early 1999, and the Turkish State Security Court subsequently sentenced him to death. In August 1999, Ocalan announced a "peace initiative," ordering members to refrain from violence and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. At a PKK Congress in January 2000, members supported Ocalan?s initiative and claimed the group now would use only political means to achieve its public goal of improved rights for Kurds in Turkey. In April 2002 at its 8th Party Congress, the PKK changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) and proclaimed a commitment to non-violent activities in support of Kurdish rights. In late 2003, the group sought to engineer another political face-lift, renaming itself Kongra-Gel (KGK) and promoting its "peaceful" intentions while continuing to conduct attacks in "self-defense" and to refuse disarmament. After five years, the group?s hard-line militant wing, the People?s Defense Force (HPG), renounced its self-imposed cease-fire on June 1, 2004. Over the course of the cease-fire, the group had divided into two factions -- politically-minded reformists, and hardliners who advocated a return to violence. The hardliners took control of the group in February 2004.
Activities
Primary targets have been Turkish Government security forces, local Turkish officials, and villagers who oppose the organization in Turkey. It conducted attacks on Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of West European cities in 1993 and again in spring 1995. In an attempt to damage Turkey’s tourist industry, the then-PKK bombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists in the early-to-mid-1990s. While most of the group’s violence in 2004 was directed toward Turkish security forces, KGK was likely responsible for an unsuccessful July car bomb attack against the governor of Van Province, although it publicly denied responsibility, and may have played a role in the August bombings of two Istanbul hotels and a gas complex in which two people died.
Strengths
Approximately 4,000 to 5,000, 3,000 to 3,500 of whom currently are located in northern Iraq. The group has thousands of sympathizers in Turkey and Europe. In November, Dutch police raided a suspected KGK training camp in The Netherlands, arresting roughly 30 suspected members.
External Aid
Has received safe haven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Syria and Iran appear to cooperate with Turkey against KGK in a limited fashion when it serves their immediate interests. KGK uses Europe for fundraising and conducting political propaganda.
• Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM)
Locations/Area of Operations
East Asia / Pacific - Indonesia, Rwanda
The KMM is reported to have networks in the Malaysian states of Perak, Johor, Kedah, Selangor, Terengganu, and Kelantan. They also operate in Kuala Lumpur. According to press reports, the KMM has ties to radical Indonesian Islamic groups and has sent members to Ambon, Indonesia, to fight against Christians and to the southern Philippines for operational training.
Description
Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KMM) favors the overthrow of the Malaysian Government and the creation of an Islamic state comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, and the southern Philippines. Malaysian authorities believe an extremist wing of the KMM has engaged in terrorist acts and has close ties to the regional terrorist organization Jemaah Islamiya (JI). Key JI leaders, including the group’s spiritual head, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, and JI operational leader Hambali, reportedly had great influence over KMM members. The Government of Singapore asserts that a Singaporean JI member assisted the KMM in buying a boat to support jihad activities in Indonesia.
Activities
Malaysia is holding a number of KMM members under the Internal Security Act (ISA) for activities deemed threatening to Malaysia’s national security, including planning to wage jihad, possession of weaponry, bombings and robberies, the murder of a former state assemblyman, and planning attacks on foreigners, including US citizens. A number of those detained are also believed to be members of Jemaah Islamiya. Several of the arrested KMM militants have reportedly undergone military training in Afghanistan, and some fought with the Afghan mujahedin during the war against the former Soviet Union. Some members are alleged to have ties to Islamic extremist organizations in Indonesia and the Philippines. In September 2003, alleged KMM leader Nik Adli Nik Abdul Aziz’s detention was extended for another two years. In March 2004, Aziz and other suspected KMM members went on a hunger strike as part of an unsuccessful bid for freedom, but the Malaysian court rejected their applications for a writ of habeas corpus in September. One alleged KMM member was sentenced to 10 years in prison for unlawful possession of firearms, explosives, and ammunition, but eight other alleged members in detention since 2001 were released in July and in November. The Malaysian Government is confident that the arrests of KMM leaders have crippled the organization and rendered it incapable of engaging in militant activities. Malaysian officials in May 2004 denied Thailand’s charge that the KMM was involved in the Muslim separatist movement in southern Thailand.
Strengths
KMM’s current membership is unknown.
External Aid
Largely unknown, probably self-financing.
• Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)
Description
Founded in 1974 as a Marxist-Leninist insurgent group primarily composed of Turkish Kurds. The group’s goal has been to establish an independent Kurdish state in southeastern Turkey, where the population is predominantly Kurdish. In the early 1990s, the PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to include urban terrorism. Turkish authorities captured Chairman Abdullah Ocalan in Kenya in early 1999; the Turkish State Security Court subsequently sentenced him to death. In August 1999, Ocalan announced a "peace initiative," ordering members to refrain from violence and requesting dialogue with Ankara on Kurdish issues. At a PKK Congress in January 2000, members supported Ocalan’s initiative and claimed the group now would use only political means to achieve its new goal, improved rights for Kurds in Turkey.
Activities
Primary targets have been Turkish Government security forces in Turkey. Conducted attacks on Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities in dozens of West European cities in 1993 and again in spring 1995. In an attempt to damage Turkey’s tourist industry, the PKK bombed tourist sites and hotels and kidnapped foreign tourists in the early to mid-1990s.
Strength
Approximately 4,000 to 5,000, most of whom currently are located in northern Iraq. Has thousands of sympathizers in Turkey and Europe.
Location/Area of Operation
Operates in Turkey, Europe, and the Middle East.
External Aid
Has received safehaven and modest aid from Syria, Iraq, and Iran. Damascus generally upheld its September 2000 antiterror agreement with Ankara, pledging not to support the PKK.
• Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) (Army of Jhangvi)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Afghanistan, Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
LJ is active primarily in Punjab and Karachi. Some members travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Description
Lashkar I Jhangvi (LJ) is the militant offshoot of the Sunni sectarian group Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP). The group focuses primarily on anti-Shia attacks and was banned by Pakistani President Musharraf in August 2001 as part of an effort to rein in sectarian violence. Many of its members then sought refuge with the Taliban in Afghanistan, with whom they had existing ties. Location: LJ is active primarily in Punjab and Karachi. Some members travel between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
Activities
LJ specializes in armed attacks and bombings. The group attempted to assassinate former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother Shabaz Sharif, Chief Minister of Punjab Province, in January 1999. Pakistani authorities have publicly linked LJ members to the kidnap and murder of US journalist Daniel Pearl in early 2002. Police officials initially suspected LJ members were involved in the two suicide car bombings in Karachi in 2002 against a French shuttle bus in May and the US Consulate in June but their subsequent investigations have not led to any LJ members being charged in the attacks. Similarly, press reports have linked LJ to attacks on Christian targets in Pakistan, including a grenade assault on the Protestant International Church in Islamabad in March 2002 that killed two US citizens, but no formal charges have been filed against the group.
Strengths
Probably fewer than 100.
External Aid
Unknown.
• Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LT) (Army of the Righteous)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
Based in Muridke (near Lahore) and Muzaffarabad
Description
LT is the armed wing of the Pakistan-based religious organization, Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), an anti-US Sunni missionary organization formed in 1989. LT is led by Hafiz Muhammad Saeed and is one of the three largest and best trained groups fighting in Kashmir against India. It is not connected to any political party. The Pakistani Government banned the group and froze its assets in January 2002. Elements of LT and Jaish-e-Mohammed combined with other groups to mount attacks as "The Save Kashmir Movement."
Activities
LT has conducted a number of operations against Indian troops and civilian targets in Jammu and Kashmir since 1993. LT claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in 2001, including an attack in January on Srinagar airport that killed five Indians; an attack on a police station in Srinagar that killed at least eight officers and wounded several others; and an attack in April against Indian border security forces that left at least four dead. The Indian Government publicly implicated LT, along with JEM, for the attack on December 13, 2001, on the Indian Parliament building, although concrete evidence is lacking. LT is also suspected of involvement in the attack on May 14, 2002, on an Indian Army base in Kaluchak that left 36 dead. Senior al-Qa’ida lieutenant Abu Zubaydah was captured at an LT safe house in Faisalabad in March 2002, suggesting some members are facilitating the movement of al-Qa’ida members in Pakistan.
Strengths
Has several thousand members in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan, in the southern Jammu and Kashmir and Doda regions, and in the Kashmir valley. Almost all LT members are Pakistanis from madrassas across Pakistan or Afghan veterans of the Afghan wars.
External Aid
Collects donations from the Pakistani community in the Persian Gulf and United Kingdom, Islamic NGOs, and Pakistani and other Kashmiri business people. LT also maintains a Web site (under the name Jamaat ud-Daawa), through which it solicits funds and provides information on the group’s activities. The amount of LT funding is unknown. LT maintains ties to religious/militant groups around the world, ranging from the Philippines to the Middle East and Chechnya through the fraternal network of its parent organization Jamaat ud-Dawa (formerly Markaz Dawa ul-Irshad). In anticipation of asset seizures by the Pakistani Government, the LT withdrew funds from bank accounts and invested in legal businesses, such as commodity trading, real estate, and production of consumer goods.
• Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) (The Tamil Tigers, The Ellalan Force)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Portugal
The LTTE controls most of the northern and eastern coastal areas of Sri Lanka but has conducted operations throughout the island. Headquartered in northern Sri Lanka, LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran has established an extensive network of checkpoints and informants to keep track of any outsiders who enter the group’s area of control.
Description
Founded in 1976, the LTTE is the most powerful Tamil group in Sri Lanka. It began its insurgency against the Sri Lankan Government in 1983 and has relied on a guerrilla strategy that includes the use of terrorist tactics. The LTTE currently is observing a cease-fire agreement with the Sri Lankan Government.
Activities
The LTTE has integrated a battlefield insurgent strategy with a terrorist program that targets key personnel in the countryside and senior Sri Lankan political and military leaders in Colombo and other urban centers. The LTTE is most notorious for its cadre of suicide bombers, the Black Tigers. Political assassinations and bombings were commonplace tactics prior to the cease-fire.
Strengths
Exact strength is unknown, but the LTTE is estimated to have 8,000 to 10,000 armed combatants in Sri Lanka, with a core of trained fighters of approximately 3,000 to 6,000. The LTTE also has a significant overseas support structure for fundraising, weapons procurement, and propaganda activities.
External Aid
The LTTE’s overt organizations support Tamil separatism by lobbying foreign governments and the United Nations. The LTTE also uses its international contacts and the large Tamil diaspora in North America, Europe, and Asia to procure weapons, communications, funding, and other needed supplies.
• Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Al-Jam’a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah, Fighting Islamic Group, Libyan Fighting Group, Libyan Islamic Group)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Russia
Probably maintains a clandestine presence in Libya, but since the late 1990s many members have fled to various Asian, Persian Gulf, African, and European countries, particularly the United Kingdom.
Description
The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) emerged in the early 1990s among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan and against the Qadhafi regime in Libya. The LIFG declared the Government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintain a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organize against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Usama Bin Ladin and believed to be part of al-Qa’ida’s leadership structure or active in the international terrorist network.
Activities
Libyans associated with the LIFG are part of the broader international jihadist movement. The LIFG is one of the groups believed to have planned the Casablanca suicide bombings in May 2003. The LIFG claimed responsibility for a failed assassination attempt against Qadhafi in 1996 and engaged Libyan security forces in armed clashes during the 1990s. It continues to target Libyan interests and may engage in sporadic clashes with Libyan security forces.
Strengths
Not known, but probably has several hundred active members or supporters.
External Aid
Not known. May obtain some funding through private donations, various Islamic non-governmental organizations, and criminal acts.
• Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
Locations/Area of Operations
Sub-Saharan Africa - Romania, Sudan
Northern Uganda and southern Sudan.
Description
The LRA was formally established in 1994, succeeding the ethnic Acholi-dominated Holy Spirit Movement and other insurgent groups. LRA leader Joseph Kony has called for the overthrow of the Ugandan Government and its replacement with a regime run on the basis of the Ten Commandments. More frequently, however, he has spoken of the liberation and honor of the Acholi people, whom he sees as oppressed by the "foreign" Government of Ugandan President Museveni. Kony is the LRA’s undisputed leader. He claims to have supernatural powers and to receive messages from spirits, which he uses to formulate the LRA’s strategy.
Activities
The Acholi people, whom Kony claims to be fighting to liberate, are the ones who suffer most from his actions. Since the early 1990’s, the LRA has kidnapped some 20,000 Ugandan children, mostly ethnic Acholi, to replenish its ranks. Kony despises Acholi elders for having given up the fight against Museveni and relies on abducted children who can be brutally indoctrinated to fight for the LRA. The LRA forces kidnapped children and adult civilians to become soldiers, porters, and "wives" for LRA leaders. The LRA prefers to attack camps for internally displaced persons and other civilian targets, avoiding direct engagement with the Ugandan military. Victims of LRA attacks sometimes have their hands, fingers, ears, noses, or other extremities cut off. The LRA stepped up its activities from 2002 to 2004 after the Ugandan army, with the Sudanese Government’s permission, attacked LRA positions inside Sudan. By late 2003, the number of internally displaced had doubled to 1.4 million, and the LRA had pushed deep into non-Acholi areas where it had never previously operated. During 2004, a combination of military pressure, offers of amnesty, and several rounds of negotiation markedly degraded LRA capabilities due to death, desertion, and defection of senior commanders.
Strengths
Estimated in early 2004 at between 500 and 1,000 fighters, 85 percent of whom are abducted children and civilians, but numbers have since declined significantly.
External Aid
Although the LRA has been supported by the Government of Sudan in the past, the Sudanese now appear to be cooperating with the Government of Uganda in a campaign to eliminate LRA sanctuaries in Sudan.
• Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Saudi Arabia
Northern Ireland and Ireland.
Description
An extreme Loyalist group formed in 1996 as a faction of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), the LVF did not emerge publicly until 1997. Composed largely of UVF hardliners who have sought to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland by attacking Catholic politicians, civilians, and Protestant politicians who endorse the Northern Ireland peace process. LVF occasionally uses the Red Hand Defenders as a cover name for its actions but has also called for the group’s disbandment. In October 2001, the British Government ruled that the LVF had broken the cease-fire it declared in 1998 after linking the group to the murder of a journalist. According to the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning, the LVF decommissioned a small amount of weapons in December 1998, but it has not repeated this gesture. Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.
Activities
Bombings, kidnappings, and close-quarter shooting attacks. Finances its activities with drug money and other criminal activities. LVF attacks have been particularly vicious; the group has murdered numerous Catholic civilians with no political or paramilitary affiliations, including an 18-year-old Catholic girl in July 1997 because she had a Protestant boyfriend. The terrorists also have conducted successful attacks against Irish targets in Irish border towns. From 2000 to 2004, the LVF has been engaged in a violent feud with other Loyalists, which has left several men dead.
Strengths
Small, perhaps dozens of active members.
External Aid
None.
• Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Afghanistan, Canada, Monaco
Morocco, Western Europe, Afghanistan, and Canada.
Description
The goals of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) include establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supporting al-Qa?ida?s jihad against the West. The group appears to have emerged in the 1990s and is comprised of Moroccan recruits who trained in armed camps in Afghanistan and some who fought in the Afghan resistance against Soviet occupation. GICM members interact with other North African extremists, particularly in Europe. On November 22, 2002, the United States designated the GICM for asset freeze under EO 13224 following the group?s submission to the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee
Activities
Moroccans associated with the GICM are part of the broader international jihadist movement. GICM is one of the groups believed to be involved in planning the May 2003 Casablanca suicide bombings, and has been involved in other plots. Members work with other North African extremists, engage in trafficking falsified documents, and possibly arms smuggling. The group in the past has issued communiqués and statements against the Moroccan Government. In the last year, a number of arrests in Belgium, France, and Spain have disrupted the group’s ability to operate, though cells and key members still remain throughout Europe. Although the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, among others, claimed responsibility on behalf of al-Qa’ida, Spanish authorities are investigating the possibility that GICM was involved in the March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombings.
Strengths
Unknown.
External Aid
Unknown, but believed to include criminal activity abroad.
• Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK or MKO)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Saudi Arabia
In the 1980s, the MEK’s leaders were forced by Iranian security forces to flee to France. On resettling in Iraq in 1987, almost all of its armed units were stationed in fortified bases near the border with Iran. Since Operation Iraqi Freedom, the bulk of the group is limited to Camp Ashraf, although an overseas support structure remains with associates and supporters scattered throughout Europe and North America.
Description
The MEK philosophy mixes Marxism and Islam. Formed in the 1960s, the organization was expelled from Iran after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, and its primary support came from the former Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein starting in the late 1980s. The MEK conducted anti-West-ern attacks prior to the Islamic Revolution. Since then, it has conducted terrorist attacks against the interests of the clerical regime in Iran and abroad. The MEK advocates the overthrow of the Iranian regime and its replacement with the group’s own leadership.
Activities
The group’s worldwide campaign against the Iranian Government stresses propaganda and occasionally uses terrorism. During the 1970s, the MEK killed US military personnel and US civilians working on defense projects in Tehran and supported the takeover in 1979 of the US Embassy in Tehran. In 1981, the MEK detonated bombs in the head office of the Islamic Republic Party and the Premier’s office, killing some 70 high-ranking Iranian officials, including Chief Justice Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, President Mohammad-Ali Rajaei, and Premier Mohammad-Javad Bahonar. Near the end of the 19801988 war with Iran, Baghdad armed the MEK with military equipment and sent it into action against Iranian forces. In 1991, the MEK assisted the Government of Iraq in suppressing the Shia and Kurdish uprisings in southern Iraq and the Kurdish uprisings in the north. In April 1992, the MEK conducted near-simultaneous attacks on Iranian embassies and installations in 13 countries, demonstrating the group’s ability to mount large-scale operations overseas. In April 1999, the MEK targeted key military officers and assassinated the deputy chief of the Iranian Armed Forces General Staff. In April 2000, the MEK attempted to assassinate the commander of the Nasr Headquarters, Tehran’s interagency board responsible for coordinating policies on Iraq. The normal pace of anti-Iranian operations increased during "Operation Great Bahman" in February 2000, when the group launched a dozen attacks against Iran. One of those attacks included a mortar attack against the leadership complex in Tehran that housed the offices of the Supreme Leader and the President. In 2000 and 2001, the MEK was involved regularly in mortar attacks and hit-and-run raids on Iranian military and law enforcement units and Government buildings near the Iran-Iraq border, although MEK terrorism in Iran declined toward the end of 2001. After Coalition aircraft bombed MEK bases at the outset of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the MEK leadership ordered its members not to resist Coalition forces, and a formal cease-fire arrangement was reached in May 2003.
Strengths
Over 3,000 MEK members are currently confined to Camp Ashraf, the MEK’s main compound north of Baghdad, where they remain under the Geneva Convention’s "protected person" status and Coalition control. As a condition of the cease-fire agreement, the group relinquished its weapons, including tanks, armored vehicles, and heavy artillery. A significant number of MEK personnel have "defected" from the Ashraf group, and several dozen of them have been voluntarily repatriated to Iran.
External Aid
Before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the group received all of its military assistance, and most of its financial support, from the former Iraqi regime. The MEK also has used front organizations to solicit contributions from expatriate Iranian communities.
• National Liberation Army (ELN)
Locations/Area of Operations
Americas - Colombia, Venezuela
Mostly in rural and mountainous areas of northern, northeastern, and southwestern Colombia, and Venezuelan border regions.
Description
The ELN is a Colombian Marxist insurgent group formed in 1965 by urban intellectuals inspired by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. It is primarily rural-based, although it possesses several urban units. In May 2004, Colombian President Uribe proposed a renewal of peace talks, but by the end of the year talks had not commenced.
Activities
Kidnapping, hijacking, bombing, and extortion. Minimal conventional military capability. Annually conducts hundreds of kidnappings for ransom, often targeting foreign employees of large corporations, especially in the petroleum industry. Derives some revenue from taxation of the illegal narcotics industry. Frequently assaults energy infrastructure and has inflicted major damage on pipelines and the electric distribution network.
Strengths
Approximately 3,000 armed combatants and an unknown number of active supporters.
External Aid
Cuba provides some medical care and political consultation. Venezuela continues to provide a hospitable environment.
• New People’s Army/Communist Party of Philippines (CPP/NPA)
Locations/Area of Operations
East Asia / Pacific - Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
Operates in rural Luzon, Visayas, and parts of Mindanao. Has cells in Manila and other metropolitan centers.
Description
The military wing of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), the NPA is a Maoist group formed in March 1969 with the aim of overthrowing the Government through protracted guerrilla warfare. The chairman of the CPP’s Central Committee and the NPA’s founder, Jose Maria Sison, reportedly directs CPP and NPA activity from The Netherlands, where he lives in self-imposed exile. Fellow Central Committee member and director of the CPP’s overt political wing, the National Democratic Front (NDF), Luis Jalandoni also lives in The Netherlands and has become a Dutch citizen. Although primarily a rural-based guerrilla group, the NPA has an active urban infrastructure to support its terrorist activities and uses city-based assassination squads. The rebels have claimed that the FTO designation has made it difficult to obtain foreign funding and forced them to step up extortion of businesses and politicians in the Philippines.
Activities
The NPA primarily targets Philippine security forces, politicians, judges, government informers, former rebels who wish to leave the NPA, rival splinter groups, alleged criminals, Philippine infrastructure, and businesses that refuse to pay extortion, or "revolutionary taxes." The NPA opposes any US military presence in the Philippines and attacked US military interests, killing several US service personnel, before the US base closures in 1992. Press reports in 1999 and in late 2001 indicated the NPA was again targeting US troops participating in joint military exercises, as well as US Embassy personnel. The NPA has claimed responsibility for the assassination of two congressmen from Quezon in May 2001 and Cagayan in June 2001 and for many other killings. In January 2002, the NPA publicly expressed its intent to target US personnel if discovered in NPA operating areas.
Strengths
Estimated at less than 9,000, a number significantly lower than its peak strength of around 25,000 in the 1980s.
External Aid
Unknown.
• New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC) a.k.a. Brigate Rosse/ Partito Comunista Combattente
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Saudi Arabia
Italy.
Description
This Marxist-Leninist group is a successor to the Red Brigades, active in the 1970s and 1980s. In addition to ideology, both groups share the same symbol, a five-pointed star inside a circle. The group is opposed to Italy’s foreign and labor policies and to NATO.
Activities
In 2004, the BR/PCC continued to suffer setbacks, with their leadership in prison and other members under pressure from the Italian Government. The BR/PCC did not claim responsibility for a blast at an employment agency in Milan in late October, although the police suspect remnants of the group are responsible. In 2003, Italian authorities captured at least seven members of the BR/ PCC, dealing the terrorist group a severe blow to its operational effectiveness. Some of those arrested are suspects in the assassination in 1999 of Labor Ministry adviser Massimo D’Antona, and authorities are hoping to link them to the assassination in 2002 of Labor Ministry advisor Marco Biagi. The arrests in October came on the heels of a clash in March 2003 involving Italian Railway Police and two BR/PCC members, which resulted in the deaths of one of the operatives and an Italian security officer. The BR/PCC has financed its activities through armed robberies.
Strengths
Fewer than 20.
External Aid
Unknown
• The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Description
Originated among militant Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s. PIJ-Shiqaqi faction, currently led by Ramadan Shallah in Damascus, is most active. Committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel through holy war. Also opposes moderate Arab governments that it believes have been tainted by Western secularism.
Activities
PIJ activists have conducted many attacks including large-scale suicide bombings against Israeli civilian and military targets. The group increased its operational activity in 2001 during the Intifadah, claiming numerous attacks against Israeli interests. The group has not targeted US interests and continues to confine its attacks to Israelis inside Israel and the territories.
Strength
Unknown.
Location/Area of Operation
Primarily Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and other parts of the Middle East, including Lebanon and Syria, where the leadership is based.
External Aid
Receives financial assistance from Iran and limited logistic support assistance from Syria.
Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Saudi Arabia
Based in Iraq since 1990, has a presence in Lebanon and the West Bank. .
Description
The Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) broke away from the PFLP-GC in the late 1970s and later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. The pro-PLO faction was led by Muhammad Abbas (a.k.a. Abu Abbas) and was based in Baghdad prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Activities
Abbas’ group was responsible for the attack in 1985 on the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. Abu Abbas died of natural causes in April 2004 while in US custody in Iraq. Current leadership and membership of the relatively small PLF appears to be based in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories. The PLF has become more active since the start of the al-Aqsa intifadah and several PLF members have been arrested by Israeli authorities for planning attacks in Israel and the West Bank.
Strengths
Unknown.
External Aid
Received support mainly from Iraq; has received support from Libya in the past.
• People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Senegal
Operates mainly in the Cape Town area.
Description
People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD) and its ally Qibla (an Islamic fundamentalist group that favors political Islam and takes an anti-US and anti-Israel stance) view the South African Government as a threat to Islamic values. The two groups work to promote a greater political voice for South African Muslims. PAGAD has used front names such as Muslims Against Global Oppression and Muslims Against Illegitimate Leaders when launching anti-Western protests and campaigns.
Activities
PAGAD formed in November 1995 as a vigilante group in reaction to crime in some neighborhoods of Cape Town. In September 1996, a change in the group’s leadership resulted in a change in the group’s goal, and it began to support a violent jihad to establish an Islamic state. Between 1996 and 2000, PAGAD conducted a total of 189 bomb attacks, including nine bombings in the Western Cape that caused serious injuries. PAGAD’s targets included South African authorities, moderate Muslims, synagogues, gay nightclubs, tourist attractions, and West-ern-associated restaurants. PAGAD is believed to have masterminded the bombing on August 25, 1998, of the Cape Town Planet Hollywood. Since 2001, PAGAD’s violent activities have been severely curtailed by law enforcement and prosecutorial efforts against leading members of the organization. Qibla leadership has organized demonstrations against visiting US dignitaries and other protests, but the extent of PAGAD’s involvement is uncertain.
Strengths
Early estimates were several hundred members. Current operational strength is unknown, but probably vastly diminished.
External Aid
May have ties to international Islamic extremists.
• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Israel, Lebanon, Slovenia, Syria
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.
Description
Formerly a part of the PLO, the Marxist-Leninist PFLP was founded by George Habash when it broke away from the Arab Nationalist Movement in 1967. The PFLP does not view the Palestinian struggle as religious, seeing it instead as a broader revolution against Western imperialism. The group earned a reputation for spectacular international attacks, including airline hijackings, that have killed at least 20 US citizens.
Activities
The PFLP committed numerous international terrorist attacks during the 1970s. Since 1978, the group has conducted attacks against Israeli or moderate Arab targets, including killing a settler and her son in December 1996. The PFLP has stepped up its operational activity since the start of the current intifadah, highlighted by at least two suicide bombings since 2003, multiple joint operations with other Palestinian terrorist groups, and assassination of the Israeli Tourism Minster in 2001 to avenge Israel’s killing of the PFLP Secretary General earlier that year.
Strengths
Unknown
External Aid
Receives safe haven and some logistical assistance from Syria.
• Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command (PFLP-GC)
Description
Split from the PFLP in 1968, claiming it wanted to focus more on fighting and less on politics. Opposed to Arafat’s PLO. Led by Ahmad Jabril, a former captain in the Syrian Army. Closely tied to both Syria and Iran.
Activities
Carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during 1970s-80s. Known for cross-border terrorist attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders. Primary focus now on guerrilla operations in southern Lebanon, small-scale attacks in Israel, West Bank, and Gaza.
Strength
Several hundred.
Location/Area of Operation
Headquartered in Damascus with bases in Lebanon.
External Aid
• Real IRA (RIRA)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Ireland, Romania
Northern Ireland, Great Britain, and Irish Republic. .
Description
RIRA was formed in the late 1990s as the clandestine armed wing of the 32-County Sovereignty Movement, a "political pressure group" dedicated to removing British forces from Northern Ireland and unifying Ireland. The RIRA also seeks to disrupt the Northern Ireland peace process. The 32-County Sovereignty Movement opposed Sinn Fein’s adoption in September 1997 of the Mitchell principles of democracy and non-violence; it also opposed the amendment in December 1999 of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution, which had claimed the territory of Northern Ireland. Despite internal rifts and calls by some jailed members -- including the group’s founder Michael "Mickey" McKevitt -- for a ceasefire and disbandment, RIRA has pledged additional violence and continues to conduct attacks.
Activities
Bombings, assassinations, and robberies. Many Real IRA members are former Provisional Irish Republican Army members who left that organization after the Provisional IRA renewed its cease-fire in 1997. These members brought a wealth of experience in terrorist tactics and bomb making to RIRA. Targets have included civilians (most notoriously in the Omagh bombing in August 1998), British security forces, police in Northern Ireland, and local Protestant communities. RIRA’s most recent fatal attack was in August 2002 at a London army base that killed a construction worker. In 2004, RIRA conducted several postal bomb attacks and made threats against prison officers, people involved in the new policing arrangements, and senior politicians. RIRA also planted incendiary devices in Belfast shopping areas and conducted a serious shooting attack against a Police Service of Northern Ireland station in September. The organization reportedly wants to improve its intelligence-gathering ability, engineering capacity, and access to weaponry; it also trains members in the use of guns and explosives. RIRA continues to attract new members, and its senior members are committed to launching attacks on security forces. Arrests in the spring led to the discovery of incendiary and explosive devices at a RIRA bomb making facility in Limerick. The group also engaged in smuggling and other non-terrorist crime in Ireland.
Strengths
The number of activists may have fallen to less than 100. The organization may receive limited support from IRA hardliners and Republican sympathizers dissatisfied with the IRA’s continuing cease-fire and Sinn Fein’s involvement in the peace process. Approximately 40 RIRA members are in Irish jails.
External Aid
Suspected of receiving funds from sympathizers in the United States and of attempting to buy weapons from US gun dealers. RIRA also is reported to have purchased sophisticated weapons from the Balkans, and to have taken materials from Provisional IRA arms dumps in the later 1990s.
• Red Hand Defenders (RHD)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Saudi Arabia
Northern Ireland.
Description
The RHD is an extremist terrorist group formed in 1998 and composed largely of Protestant hardliners from Loyalist groups observing a cease-fire. RHD seeks to prevent a political settlement with Irish nationalists by attacking Catholic civilian interests in Northern Ireland. In January 2002, the group announced all staff at Catholic schools in Belfast and Catholic postal workers were legitimate targets. Despite calls in February 2002 by the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), and Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) to announce its disbandment, RHD continued to make threats and issue claims of responsibility. RHD is a cover name often used by elements of the banned UDA and LVF. Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001.
Activities
In early 2003, the RHD claimed responsibility for killing two UDA members as a result of what is described as Loyalist internecine warfare. It also claimed responsibility for a bomb that was left in the offices of Republican Sinn Fein in West Belfast, although the device was defused and no one was injured. In recent years, the group has carried out numerous pipe bombings and arson attacks against "soft" civilian targets such as homes, churches, and private businesses. In January 2002, the group bombed the home of a prison official in North Belfast. Twice in 2002 the group claimed responsibility for attacks -- the murder of a Catholic postman and a Catholic teenager -- that were later claimed by the UDAUFF, further blurring distinctions between the groups. In 2001, RHD claimed responsibility for killing five persons. The RHD has claimed responsibility for hoax bomb devices, and recently has set off petrol bombs and made death threats against local politicians.
Strengths
Up to 20 members, some of whom have experience in terrorist tactics and bomb making. Police arrested one member in June 2001 for making a hoax bomb threat.
External Aid
None.
• Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Locations/Area of Operations
Americas - Singapore
Primarily in Colombia with some activities -- extortion, kidnapping, weapons sourcing, logistics, and R&R -- suspected in neighboring Brazil, Venezuela, Panama, Peru, and Ecuador.
Description
Established in 1964 as the military wing of the Colombian Communist Party, the FARC is Latin America’s oldest, largest, most capable, and best-equipped insurgency of Marxist origin. Although only nominally fighting in support of Marxist goals today, the FARC is governed by a general secretariat led by long-time leader Manuel Marulanda (a.k.a. "Tirofijo") and six others, including senior military commander Jorge Briceno (a.k.a. "Mono Jojoy"). Organized along military lines but includes some specialized urban fighting units. A Colombian military offensive targeting FARC fighters in their former safe haven in southern Colombia has experienced some success, with several FARC mid-level leaders killed or captured. On December 31, 2004, FARC leader Simon Trinidad, the highest-ranking FARC leader ever captured, was extradited to the United States on drug charges.
Activities
Bombings, murder, mortar attacks, kidnapping, extortion, and hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional military action against Colombian political, military, and economic targets. In March 1999, the FARC executed three US indigenous rights activists on Venezuelan territory after it kidnapped them in Colombia. In February 2003, the FARC captured and continues to hold three US contractors and killed one other American when their plane crashed in Florencia. Foreign citizens often are targets of FARC kidnapping for ransom. The FARC has well-documented ties to the full range of narcotics trafficking activities, including taxation, cultivation, and distribution.
Strengths
Approximately 9,000 to 12,000 armed combatants and several thousand more supporters, mostly in rural areas.
External Aid
Cuba provides some medical care, safe haven, and political consultation. In December 2004, a Colombian Appeals Court declared three members of the Irish Republican Army -- arrested in Colombia in 2001 upon exiting the former FARC-controlled demilitarized zone (despeje) -- guilty of providing advanced explosives training to the FARC. The FARC often uses the Colombia/ Venezuela border area for cross-border incursions and consider Venezuelan territory as a safe haven.
• Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) a.k.a. Revolutionary Cells
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - San Marino
Primary area of operation is in the Athens metropolitan area.
Description
Revolutionary Nuclei (RN) emerged from a broad range of antiestablishment and anti-US/NATO/EU leftist groups active in Greece between 1995 and 1998. The group is believed to be the successor to or offshoot of Greece’s most prolific terrorist group, Revolutionary People’s Struggle (ELA), which has not claimed an attack since January 1995. Indeed, RN appeared to fill the void left by ELA, particularly as lesser groups faded from the scene. RN’s few communiqués show strong similarities in rhetoric, tone, and theme to ELA proclamations. RN has not claimed an attack since November 2000, nor has it announced its disbandment.
Activities
Since it began operations in January 1995, the group has claimed responsibility for some two dozen arson attacks and low-level bombings against a range of US, Greek, and other European targets in Greece. In its most infamous and lethal attack to date, the group claimed responsibility for a bomb it detonated at the Intercontinental Hotel in April 1999 that resulted in the death of a Greek woman and injured a Greek man. Its modus operandi includes warning calls of impending attacks, attacks targeting property instead of individuals, use of rudimentary timing devices, and strikes during the late-evening to early-morning hours. RN may have been responsible for two attacks in July 2003 against a US insurance company and a local bank in Athens. RN’s last confirmed attacks against US interests in Greece came in November 2000, with two separate bombings against the Athens offices of Citigroup and the studio of a Greek-American sculptor. Greek targets have included judicial and other Government office buildings, private vehicles, and the offices of Greek firms involved in NATO-related defense contracts in Greece. Similarly, the group has attacked European interests in Athens. The group did not conduct an attack in 2004
Strengths
Group membership is believed to be small, probably drawing from the Greek militant leftist or anarchist milieu.
External Aid
Unknown, but believed to be self-sustaining.
• Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17 November)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - San Marino
Athens, Greece.
Description
17 November is a radical leftist group established in 1975 and named for the student uprising in Greece in November 1973 that protested the ruling military junta. 17 November is an anti-Greek establishment, anti-United States, anti-Turkey, and anti-NATO group that seeks the ouster of US bases from Greece, the removal of Turkish military forces from Cyprus, and the severing of Greece’s ties to NATO and the European Union (EU).
Activities
Initial attacks were assassinations of senior US officials and Greek public figures. They began using bombings in the 1980s. Since 1990, 17 November has expanded its targets to include EU facilities and foreign firms investing in Greece and has added improvised rocket attacks to its methods. It supported itself largely through bank robberies. A failed 17 November bombing attempt in June 2002 at the Port of Piraeus in Athens, coupled with robust detective work, led to the arrest of 19 members --the first 17 November operatives ever arrested. In December 2003, a Greek court convicted 15 members -- five of whom were given multiple life terms -- of hundreds of crimes. Four other alleged members were acquitted for lack of evidence. In September 2004, several jailed members serving life sentences began hunger strikes to attain better prison conditions.
Strengths
Unknown, but presumed to be small.
External Aid
Unknown.
• Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Qatar, Turkey
Turkey, primarily Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, and Adana. Raises funds in Europe.
Description
This group originally formed in Turkey in 1978 as Devrimci Sol, or Dev Sol, a splinter faction of Dev Genc (Revolutionary Youth). Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting. "Party" refers to the group’s political activities, while "Front" is a reference to the group’s militant operations. The group espouses a Marxist-Leninist ideology and is vehemently anti-US, anti-NATO, and anti-Turkish establishment. Its goals are the establishment of a socialist state and the abolition of one- to three-man prison cells, called F-type prisons. DHKP/C finances its activities chiefly through donations and extortion.
Activities
Since the late 1980s the group has targeted primarily current and retired Turkish security and military officials. It began a new campaign against foreign interests in 1990, which included attacks against US military and diplomatic personnel and facilities. To protest perceived US imperialism during the Gulf War, Dev Sol assassinated two US military contractors, wounded an Air Force officer, and bombed more than 20 US and NATO military, commercial, and cultural facilities. In its first significant terrorist act as DHKP/C in 1996, the group assassinated a prominent Turkish businessman and two others. DHKP/C added suicide bombings to its repertoire in 2001, with successful attacks against Turkish police in January and September. Since the end of 2001, DHKP/C has typically used improvised explosive devices against official Turkish targets and soft US targets of opportunity; attacks against US targets beginning in 2003 probably came in response to Operation Iraqi Freedom. Operations and arrests against the group have weakened its capabilities. DHKP/C did not conduct any major terrorist attacks in 2003, but on June 24, 2004 -- just days before the NATO summit -- an explosive device detonated, apparently prematurely, aboard a passenger bus in Istanbul while a DHKP/C operative was transporting it to another location, killing the operative and three other persons.
Strengths
Probably several dozen terrorist operatives inside Turkey, with a large support network throughout Europe. On April 1, 2004, authorities arrested more than 40 suspected DHKP/C members in coordinated raids across Turkey and Europe. In October, 10 alleged members of the group were sentenced to life imprisonment, while charges were dropped against 20 other defendants because of a statute of limitations.
External Aid
Widely believed to have training facilities or offices in Lebanon and Syria.
• Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Saudi Arabia
Mainly in Rome, Milan, Lazio, and Tuscany.
Description
The NIPR is a clandestine leftist extremist group that appeared in Rome in 2000. Adopted the logo of the Red Brigades of the 1970s and 1980s -- an encircled five point star -- for its declarations. Opposes Italy’s foreign and labor policies. Has targeted property interests rather than personnel in its attacks
Activities
The NIPR has not claimed responsibility for any attacks since an April 2001 bomb attack on a building housing a US-Italian relations association and an international affairs institute in Rome’s historic center. The NIPR claimed to have carried out a bombing in May 2000 in Rome at an oversight committee facility for implementation of the law on strikes in public services. The group also claimed responsibility for an explosion in February 2002 on Via Palermo adjacent to the Interior Ministry in Rome.
Strengths
Possibly 12 members.
External Aid
None evident.
• Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
Locations/Area of Operations
Sub-Saharan Africa - Guinea, Liberia, United States
Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea
Description
The RUF is a loosely organized force that fought a ten-year civil war to seize control of the lucrative diamond-producing regions of the country. The group funds itself largely through the extraction and sale of diamonds obtained in areas of Sierra Leone under its control. Location: Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea
Activities
The RUF was virtually dismantled by the imprisonment of RUF leader Foday Sankoh in 2001; a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration program begun in mid-2001; and the official end to the civil war in January 2002. The group’s poor showing in the May 2002 Presidential elections and the possibility of prosecution if the impending UN-sponsored Sierra Leone Special Court for war crimes have further weakened organizational cohesion. From 1991 to 2000, they used guerrilla, criminal, and terror tactics, such as murder, torture, and mutilation, to fight the government, intimidate civilians, and keep UN peacekeeping units in check. In 2000, they held hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage until their release was negotiated, in part, by the RUF’s chief sponsor, Liberian President Charles Taylor. The group also has been accused of attacks in Guinea at the behest of President Taylor.
Strengths
Once estimated at several thousand supporters and sympathizers, the group has dwindled to several hundred, although many of the demobilized fighters have not been reintegrated into society and could take up arms against the government again
External Aid
A UN experts’ panel report on Sierra Leone said President Charles Taylor of Liberia provided support and leadership to the RUF. The UN also identified Libya, Gambia, and Burkina Faso as conduits for weapons and other materiel for the RUF.
• Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe
Primarily Russia.
Description
Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion of Chechen Martyrs (RSRSBCM), led by Chechen extremist leader Shamil Basayev, uses terrorism as part of an effort to secure an independent Muslim state in the North Caucasus. Basayev claimed the group was responsible for the Beslan school hostage crisis of September 1-3, 2004, which culminated in the deaths of about 330 people; simultaneous suicide bombings aboard two Russian civilian airliners in late August 2004; and a third suicide bombing outside a Moscow subway that same month. The RSRSBCM, whose name translates into English as "Requirements for Getting into Paradise," was not known to Western observers before October 2002, when it participated in the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow. Designated under EO 13224 in February 2003.
Activities
Primarily terrorist and guerilla operations against Russian forces, pro-Russian Chechen forces, and Russian and Chechen non-combatants.
Strengths
Probably no more than 50 fighters at any given time.
External Aid
May receive some external assistance from foreign mujahedin.
• Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa - Algeria, Canada, Mali, Mauritania, Niger
Algeria, the Sahel (i.e. northern Mali, northern Mauritania, and northern Niger), Canada, and Western Europe.
Description
The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), a splinter group of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA), seeks to overthrow the Algerian Government with the goal of installing an Islamic regime. GSPC eclipsed the GIA in approximately 1998, and is currently the most effective and largest armed group inside Algeria. In contrast to the GIA, the GSPC pledged to avoid civilian attacks inside Algeria.
Activities
The GSPC continues to conduct operations aimed at Algerian Government and military targets, primarily in rural areas, although civilians are sometimes killed. The Government of Algeria scored major counterterrorism successes against GSPC in 2004, significantly weakening the organization, which also has been plagued with internal divisions. Algerian military forces killed GSPC leader Nabil Sahraoui and one of his top lieutenants, Abbi Abdelaziz, in June 2004 in the mountainous area east of Algiers. In October, the Algerian Government took custody of Abderazak al-Para, who led a GSPC faction that held 32 European tourists hostage in 2003. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe and the Middle East maintain contact with other North African extremists sympathetic to al-Qa’ida. In late 2003, the GSPC leader issued a communiqué announcing the group’s support of a number of jihadist causes and movements, including al-Qa’ida.
Strengths
Several hundred fighters with an unknown number of facilitators outside Algeria
External Aid
Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad, many residing in Western Europe, provide financial and logistical support. GSPC members also engage in criminal activity.
• Shining Path (SL) Sendero Luminoso People’s Liberation Army
Locations/Area of Operations
Americas - Peru, Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
Peru, with most activity in rural areas.
Description
Former university professor Abimael Guzman formed SL in Peru in the late 1960s, and his teachings created the foundation of SL’s militant Maoist doctrine. In the 1980s, SL became one of the most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. Approximately 30,000 persons have died since Shining Path took up arms in 1980. The Peruvian Government made dramatic gains against SL during the 1990s, but reports of recent SL involvement in narco-trafficking and kidnapping for ransom indicate it may be developing new sources of support. Its stated goal is to destroy existing Peruvian institutions and replace them with a communist peasant revolutionary regime. It also opposes any influence by foreign governments. Peruvian Courts in 2003 granted approximately 1,900 members the right to request retrials in a civilian court, including the imprisoned top leadership. The trial of Guzman, who was arrested in 1992, was scheduled for November 5, 2004, but was postponed after the first day, when chaos erupted in the courtroom.
Activities
Conducted indiscriminate bombing campaigns and selective assassinations.
Strengths
Unknown but estimated to be some 300 armed militants.
External Aid
None.
• Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
The SSP has influence in all four provinces of Pakistan. It is considered to be one of the most powerful sectarian groups in the country.
Description
The Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP) is a Sunni sectarian group that follows the Deobandi school. Violently anti-Shia, the SSP emerged in central Punjab in the mid-1980s as a response to the Iranian Revolution. Pakistani President Musharraf banned the SSP in January 2002. In August 2002, the SSP renamed itself Millat-i-Islami Pakistan, and Musharraf re-banned the group under its new name in November 2003. The SSP also has operated as a political party, winning seats in Pakistan’s National Assembly.
Activities
The group’s activities range from organizing political rallies calling for Shia to be declared non-Muslims to assassinating prominent Shia leaders. The group was responsible for attacks on Shia worshippers in May 2004, when at least 50 people were killed.
Strengths
The SSP may have approximately 3,000 to 6,000 trained activists who carry out various kinds of sectarian activities.
External Aid
The SSP reportedly receives significant funding from Saudi Arabia through wealthy private donors in Pakistan. Funds also are acquired from other sources, including other Sunni extremist groups, madrassas, and contributions by political groups.
• Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe
Primarily Russia.
Description
The SPIR is one of three terrorist groups affiliated with Chechen guerrillas that furnished personnel to carry out the seizure of the Dubrovka Theater in Moscow in October 2002. The SPIR has had at least seven commanders since it was founded in the late 1990s. Movsar Barayev, who led and was killed during the theater standoff, was the first publicly identified leader. The group continues to conduct guerrilla operations in Chechnya under the leadership of the current leader, Amir Aslan, whose true identity is not known. Designated under EO 13224 in February 2003.
Activities
Primarily guerrilla operations against Russian forces. Has also been involved in various hostage and ransom operations, including the execution of ethnic Chechens who have collaborated with Russian authorities.
Strengths
Probably no more than 100 fighters at any given time.
External Aid
May receive some external assistance from foreign mujahedin.
• The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) CPN/M
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Saint Lucia
Operations are conducted throughout Nepal. Press reports indicate some Maoist leaders reside in India.
Description
The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) insurgency grew out of the radicalization and fragmentation of left-wing parties following Nepal’s transition to democracy in 1990. The United People’s Front -- a coalition of left-wing parties -- participated in the elections of 1991, but the Maoist wing failed to win the required minimum number of votes, leading to its exclusion from voter lists in the elections of 1994 and prompting the group to launch the insurgency in 1996. The CPN/M’s ultimate objective is the overthrow of the Nepalese Government and the establishment of a Maoist state. In 2003, the United States designated Nepal’s Maoists under Executive Order (EO) 13224 as a supporter of terrorist activity.
Activities
The Maoists have utilized traditional guerrilla warfare tactics and engage in murder, torture, arson, sabotage, extortion, child conscription, kidnapping, bombings, and assassinations to intimidate and coerce the populace. In 2002, Maoists claimed responsibility for assassinating two Nepalese US Embassy guards, citing anti-Maoist spying, and in a press statement threatened foreign embassies, including the US mission, to deter foreign support for the Nepalese Government. Maoists are suspected in the September 2004 bombing at the American Cultural Center in Kathmandu. The attack, which caused no injuries and only minor damage, marked the first time the Maoists had damaged US Government property.
Strengths
Probably several thousand full-time cadres.
External Aid
None.
• The Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Locations/Area of Operations
Middle East / N. Africa - Israel, Lebanon, Slovenia, Syria
Primarily Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip. The group’s primary leadership resides in Syria, though other leadership elements reside in Lebanon, as well as other parts of the Middle East.
Description
Formed by militant Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) is committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel through attacks against Israeli military and civilian targets inside Israel and the Palestinian territories.
Activities
PIJ militants have conducted many attacks, including large-scale suicide bombings, against Israeli civilian and military targets. The group maintained operational activity in 2004, claiming numerous attacks against Israeli interests. PIJ has not yet directly targeted US interests; it continues to direct attacks against Israelis inside Israel and the territories, although US citizens have died in attacks mounted by the PIJ.
Strengths
Unknown.
External Aid
Receives financial assistance from Iran and limited logistical assistance from Syria.
• The Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)
Locations/Area of Operations
South / Central Asia - Senegal
Western Europe and Afghanistan.
Description
The Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG), also known as the Jama’a Combattante Tunisienne, seeks to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and has targeted US and Western interests. The group is an offshoot of the banned Tunisian Islamist movement, an-Nahda. Founded around 2000 by Tarek Maaroufi and Saifallah Ben Hassine, the TCG has drawn members from the Tunisian diaspora in Europe and elsewhere. It has lost some of its leadership, but may still exist, particularly in Western Europe. Belgian authorities arrested Maaroufi in late 2001 and sentenced him to six years in prison in 2003 for his role in the assassination of anti-Taliban commander Ahmad Shah Massoud two days before 9/11. The TCG was designated under EO 13224 in October 2002. Historically, the group has been associated with al-Qa’ida as well. Members also have ties to other North African extremist groups. The TCG was designated for sanctions under UNSCR 1333 in December 2000.
Activities
Tunisians associated with the TCG are part of the support network of the broader international jihadist movement. According to European press reports, TCG members or affiliates in the past have engaged in trafficking falsified documents and recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some TCG associates were suspected of planning an attack against the US, Algerian, and Tunisian diplomatic missions in Rome in April 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties to the Algerian Salafist Group for Call and Combat.
Strengths
Unknown.
External Aid
Unknown.
• Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)
Locations/Area of Operations
Americas - Saint Martin (French/Dutch)
Peru, with supporters throughout Latin America and Western Europe. Controls no territory.
Description
MRTA is a traditional Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movement formed in 1983 from remnants of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, a Peruvian insurgent group active in the 1960s. It aims to establish a Marxist regime and to rid Peru of all imperialist elements (primarily US and Japanese influence). Peru’s counterterrorist program has diminished the group’s ability to conduct terrorist attacks, and the MRTA has suffered from infighting, the imprisonment or deaths of senior leaders, and the loss of leftist support.
Activities
Previously conducted bombings, kidnappings, ambushes, and assassinations, but recent activity has fallen drastically. In December 1996, 14 MRTA members occupied the Japanese Ambassador’s residence in Lima and held 72 hostages for more than four months. Peruvian forces stormed the residence in April 1997, rescuing all but one of the remaining hostages and killing all 14 group members, including the remaining leaders. The group has not conducted a significant terrorist operation since and appears more focused on obtaining the release of imprisoned MRTA members, although there are reports of low-level rebuilding efforts.
Strengths
Believed to be no more than 100 members, consisting largely of young fighters who lack leadership skills and experience.
External Aid
None.
• Turkish Hizballah
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Qatar
Primarily the Diyarbakir region of southeastern Turkey.
Description
Turkish Hizballah is a Kurdish Sunni Islamic terrorist organization that arose in the early 1980s in response to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK)’s secularist approach of establishing an independent Kurdistan. Turkish Hizballah spent its first 10 years fighting the PKK, accusing the group of atrocities against Muslims in southeastern Turkey, where Turkish Hizballah seeks to establish an independent Islamic state.
Activities
Beginning in the mid-1990s, Turkish Hizballah, which is unrelated to Lebanese Hizballah, expanded its target base and modus operandi from killing PKK militants to conducting low-level bombings against liquor stores, bordellos, and other establishments the organization considered "anti-Islamic." In January 2000, Turkish security forces killed Huseyin Velioglu, the leader of Turkish Hizballah, in a shootout at a safe house in Istanbul. The incident sparked a year-long series of counterterrorist operations against the group that resulted in the detention of some 2,000 individuals; authorities arrested several hundred of those on criminal charges. At the same time, police recovered nearly 70 bodies of Turkish and Kurdish businessmen and journalists that Turkish Hizballah had tortured and brutally murdered during the mid-to-late 1990s. The group began targeting official Turkish interests in January 2001, when its operatives assassinated the Diyarbakir police chief in the group’s most sophisticated operation to date. Turkish Hizballah did not conduct a major operation in 2003 or 2004 and probably is focusing on recruitment, fundraising, and reorganization.
Strengths
Possibly a few hundred members and several thousand supporters.
External Aid
It is widely believed that Turkey’s security apparatus originally backed Turkish Hizballah to help the Turkish Government combat the PKK. Alternative views are that the Turkish Government turned a blind eye to Turkish Hizballah’s activities because its primary targets were PKK members and supporters, or that the Government simply had to prioritize scarce resources and was unable to wage war on both groups simultaneously. Allegations of collusion have never been laid to rest, and the Government of Turkey continues to issue denials. Turkish Hizballah also is suspected of having ties with Iran, although there is not sufficient evidence to establish a link.
• Ulster Defense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)
Locations/Area of Operations
Europe - Saudi Arabia
Northern Ireland. Some support on the UK mainland.
Description
The Ulster Defense Association (UDA), the largest Loyalist paramilitary group in Northern Ireland, was formed in 1971 as an umbrella organization for Loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF). Today, the UFF constitutes almost the entire UDA membership. The UDA/UFF declared a series of cease-fires between 1994 and 1998. In September 2001, the UDA/ UFF’s Inner Council withdrew its support for Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement. The following month, after a series of murders, bombings, and street violence, the British Government ruled the UDA/UFF’s cease-fire defunct. The dissolution of the organization’s political wing, the Ulster Democratic Party, soon followed. In January 2002, however, the UDA created the Ulster Political Research Group to serve in a similar capacity. Designated under EO 13224 in December 2001
Activities
The UDA/UFF has evolved into a criminal organization deeply involved in drug trafficking and other moneymaking criminal activities through six largely independent "brigades." It has also been involved in murder, shootings, arson, and assaults. According to the International Monitoring Commission, "the UDA has the capacity to launch serious, if crude, attacks." Some UDA activities have been of a sectarian nature directed at the Catholic community, aimed at what are sometimes described as ‘soft’ targets, and often have taken place at the interface between the Protestant and Catholic communities, especially in Belfast. The organization continues to be involved in targeting individual Catholics and has undertaken attacks against retired and serving prison officers. The group has also been involved in a violent internecine war with other Loyalist paramilitary groups for the past several years. In February 2003, the UDA/UFF declared a 12-month cease-fire, but refused to decommission its arsenal until Republican groups did likewise and emphasized its continued disagreement with the Good Friday accords. The cease-fire has been extended. Even though numerous attacks on Catholics were blamed on the group, the UDA/ UFF did not claim credit for any attacks, and in August 2003 reiterated its intention to remain militarily inactive.
Strengths
Estimates vary from 2,000 to 5,000 members, with several hundred active in paramilitary operations.
External Aid
Unknown.
• United Self-Defense Forces/Group of Colombia (AUC–Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia)
Description
The AUC—commonly referred to as the paramilitaries—is an umbrella organization formed in April 1997 to consolidate most local and regional paramilitary groups each with the mission to protect economic interests and combat insurgents locally. The AUC_supported by economic elites, drug traffickers, and local communities lacking effective government security_claims its primary objective is to protect its sponsors from insurgents. The AUC now asserts itself as a regional and national counterinsurgent force. It is adequately equipped and armed and reportedly pays its members a monthly salary. AUC political leader Carlos Castaño has claimed 70 percent of the AUC’s operational costs are financed with drug-related earnings, the rest from "donations" from its sponsors.
Activities
AUC operations vary from assassinating suspected insurgent supporters to engaging guerrilla combat units. Colombian National Combat operations generally consist of raids and ambushes directed against suspected insurgents. The AUC generally avoids engagements with government security forces and actions against US personnel or interests.
Strength
Estimated 6000 to 8150, including former military and insurgent personnel.
Location/Areas of Operation
AUC forces are strongest in the northwest in Antioquia, Córdoba, Sucre, and Bolívar Departments. Since 1999, the group demonstrated a growing presence in other northern and southwestern departments. Clashes between the AUC and the FARC insurgents in Putumayo in 2000 demonstrated the range of the AUC to contest insurgents throughout Colombia.
External Aid
None.
