Most arms control efforts since World War II have been devoted to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction or to heavy conventional weapons. Since the United Nations Secretary-General issued a supplement to his 1995 Agenda for Peace on the subject (January 1995), increasing attention has been given to the weapons that are actually producing the horrors witnessed in Africa, the Balkans, and other parts of the world. These weapons are small arms and light weapons (SA/LW), such as landmines, assault rifles (like the AK-47),
and machine guns. This report surveys recent efforts to examine the issues and to develop and establish appropriate and effective international controls over small arms and light weapons. The issue of controlling anti-personnel landmines has followed a separate course and is not dealt with here.
What Are Small Arms and Light Weapons?
Broadly speaking, small arms and light weapons include a wide variety of lethal instruments, from handguns to man-portable air defense systems. While there is no universally accepted definition of small arms, the term is commonly viewed as encompassing man-portable firearms and their ammunition primarily designed for individual use by military forces as lethal weapons. A typical list of small arms includes self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, sub-machine-guns, assault rifles, and light machine-guns. Not included in this list are hunting rifles, civilian handguns, and weapons considered as collector's items such as museum pieces and other weapons preserved for historical purposes.
Light weapons are usually heavier and larger than small arms and designed to be employed by a small team or crew of infantry personnel. They include some man-portable firearms and their ammunition, light artillery guns and rockets, and guided missiles for use against armored vehicles, aircraft, or fortifications. A typical list of light weapons could also include heavy machine-guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, man-portable air defense systems (such as shoulder-fired anti-aircraft guns and missiles), anti-tank guns and recoilless rifles, portable anti-tank and rocket launcher systems, and mortars of caliber below 100 mm. Light weapons fall just below the seven categories of large weapons reported to the U.N. Register of Conventional Arms, and are thus an intermediary category between "small arms" and "major weapons."
Compared to complex major weapon systems, small arms and light weapons are more widely produced and available, relatively easy to conceal, and require little maintenance, logistic support, and training to operate.
Why the Recent Increased Interest in Small Arms and Light Weapons?
Since the end of the Cold War, interest has turned to small arms and light weapons primarily as a result of the dramatic increase in the number, duration, and destructiveness of intrastate conflicts, many of which called for costly U.N. peacekeeping missions. The change in the international security landscape from a few episodic large-scale interstate wars to frequent small-scale intrastate conflicts has occurred at a time when international norms, export control regimes, and treaties to control or eliminate weapons of mass destruction are making substantial progress. At the same time, the proliferation and criminal misuse of small arms and light weapons are posing increasing threats to national and regional security.
These weapons have fueled dozens of intrastate and local conflicts around the globe -- killing, injuring, and displacing millions of people, primarily women and children, from Albania to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They are today's real weapons of mass destruction. Patrick Brogan in World Conflicts (The Scarecrow Press, 1998), reports that between 20 and 30 million deaths have occurred in the 85 wars since 1945. The Institute for International Studies (ISS) of South Africa reports that Africa alone has suffered 5,994,000 fatalities in the last 50 years due mostly to small arms and light weapons. The U.S. Committee for Refugees calculates that in 1997 there were more than 14 million refugees in foreign lands, and more than 19 million "internal refugees," a number rivaling the mass movement of peoples after World War II. In short, the regulation of small arms and light weapons, compared to weapons of mass destruction, remains a relatively underdeveloped area.
Estimates of the number of small arms and light weapons in circulation range from 100 to 500 million, with 50-80 million being AK-47 assault rifles. An increasing number of countries are becoming self-sufficient in the manufacturing of small arms and related ammunition either through indigenous or licensed production. It has been reported that an AK-47 assault rifle can be purchased on the streets of some developing countries for as little as $10 (U.S.), or in exchange for a chicken or a goat. In other countries, AK-47s can be rented by the hour by criminals solely for the purpose of carrying out a criminal act. International transfers are also a major source of small arms and light weapons supply, through a host of channels, both legal and illegal.
The negative effects of the proliferation and illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons have been far-reaching and diverse. Although most important are the increased threats to international and regional security, these effects have also been felt indirectly through dramatic increases in peacekeeping costs resulting from the increased number and intensity of intrastate conflicts. Other negative aspects of these weapons include their increased use by terrorists, the heightened threats to U.N. peacekeepers and humanitarian relief workers, and the undermining of the implementation of peace agreements. The urgent need to stem the proliferation and misuse of these weapons, which has been urged by two U.N. Secretaries-General, has raised a number of humanitarian, law enforcement, developmental, and security challenges for the international community.
Culture and the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
State sovereignty by definition includes the right to monopolize the legitimate exercise of force. Under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, states also have the right to use force in self-defense, or in defense of their sovereignty. Small arms and light weapons used to maintain domestic order and to defend a nation's borders represent the most visible and enduring manifestation of these basic rights and thus will always remain closely identified with issues of independence and sovereignty. A logical extension of these rights is that states also have the right to legally manufacture and otherwise acquire weapons necessary for self-defense.
Traditionally, it has been national rather than international laws that prescribe the terms of possession and use of small arms and light weapons by security forces and private citizens. Hence, international attempts to control small arms and light weapons must take into account these fundamental rights of states. Cultural norms, social values, and historical traditions affect domestic regulation of weapons. For example, learning to use a gun for self-defense, sporting purposes, or military training is common in many countries. The armed forces, police or militia in most countries are permitted to carry and use small arms in accordance with domestic laws, and in some countries such as the United States, private citizens can do so as well. The right to own and bear arms can even be provided in national legislation and national constitutions, as is the case in the United States. Proposals to control small arms and light weapons must take into account such differences in national orientation and the fact that states jealously guard against any encroachments from outside into their domestic policies.
The Causes of Insecurity
While small arms and light weapons play a significant role in exacerbating conflicts that exact enormous human and socioeconomic costs, the causes of such conflicts lie in political, economic, ethnic, and religious differences and disparities. These are often aggravated by governance-related deficiencies, such as exclusionary and repressive policies, and lack of, or weaknesses in, democratic institutions, respect for the rule of law, and human rights observance. Conditions of endemic insecurity and weak national and interstate regulatory and law enforcement structures, together with the fact that these weapons are cheap, widely available, easily concealed and transportable across porous borders, and require little maintenance and training, further compound the problems of widespread proliferation, illicit trafficking and possession, and criminal misuse.
Supply and Demand
Both supply-side and demand-side strategies are required if the SA/LW problem is to be surmounted. Uncontrolled weapons circulating into countries with fragile governments and histories of serious internal problems only exacerbate the causes of conflict. "Oversupply," with its many unintended consequences, obviously must be dealt with. At the same time, it is a fact that the use of weapons is often only symptomatic of deeper societal ills, ills that produce the insecurity driving the demand for weapons. Removing the instruments without addressing the causes of insecurity will simply generate a new demand for replacement weapons, leaving the sources of insecurity unaffected. Inevitably, these sources, such as underdevelopment, must be addressed if attempts at controlling weapons are to be effective. The most promising approach to the entire complex of problems associated with small arms is one that balances supply-side and demand-side efforts and integrates them with programs designed to alleviate underdevelopment and other basic causes of insecurity.
Legal or Illegal Transfers?
Legal and illegal transfers are often so closely intertwined that it is difficult to establish a clear basis for distinguishing them. Many weapons originating as legal production or exports eventually fall into illegal circulation. It is impossible to know with certainty what percentage of small arms and light weapons transfers are legal or illegal, or when and how weapons that were originally transferred legally become illegal at some point in their history.
The crisis in Somalia is a good case in point. The arms that helped turn that crisis into near anarchy can be traced directly to the flood of AK-47 assault rifles brought back to Somalia by some 200,000 fleeing teen-age soldiers from the Ogaden War. The Somalian government for legitimate security purposes acquired these weapons legally. Many weapons purchased legally for security needs in one conflict turn up being used for illicit purposes in another. They are often re-circulated by sympathetic governments or ethnic sub-groups to the army or rebel forces of another. Some weapons recovered in buy-back programs in El Salvador had been used in Vietnam, Uganda, and Angola. One of the most perplexing questions facing analysts and scholars is "how can international measures to regulate small arms and light weapons account for the ambiguity between what is licit at one time and illicit at another?"
The Response of the International Community
The United Nations has remained at the forefront of efforts to restrain the spread of small arms and light weapons. Building on its earlier initiatives which called for action to combat illicit trade and the criminal misuse of small arms and light weapons, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) has adopted a number of resolutions over recent years calling for a range of actions at all levels.
Resolution 46/36 H of December 6, 1991, called on states to curb illicit trafficking in arms by insuring better control over stocks and transfers, and by encouraging work at all levels to harmonize relevant laws and procedures. This resolution contained a list of indicative measures to be implemented at the state, regional, and international level.
Resolution 50/70 B of December 12, 1995, requested the Secretary-General to establish a panel of governmental experts to prepare a report on the nature and causes of problems of small arms. The panel of 16 nations was established and first convened on June 24, 1996, and met again in July of 1997. In October 1997, the panel issued a report that analyzed the nature and causes of small arms problems and provided a number of recommendations for voluntary action by states to address the problem.
Resolution 52/38 J of 1997, established a second panel of 23 members, convened in 1998, to review the implementation of the recommendations of the first report, to suggest further measures, and to examine the feasibility of holding an international conference on the illicit trafficking of small arms in all its aspects.
Resolution 51/45 N of December 10, 1996 and 52/38 G of December 9, 1997, were the first resolutions designed to address the post-conflict aspects of disarmament. They stressed the importance and benefits of instituting certain practical disarmament measures during and after conflicts -- measures such as collecting, controlling, and disposing of small arms and light weapons, the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and ways to restrain production and illicit transfers.
Resolution 54/54V of December 15, 1999, called for an international conference on the "illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects" during the summer of 2001. The resolution specified that the conference should produce a global action program as its primary output. The conference was scheduled to take place July 9-20, 2001. The first Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) met February 28-March 3, 2000; January 8-19, 2001; and March 20-30, 2001. The Prepcom decided on its key procedural issues and completed a second reading of its draft Program of Action. Expectations are already high about the prospects for the conference, however, a number of relatively difficult issues remain to be resolved in the text of the draft Program of Action.
United Nations action on small arms and light weapons is not limited to the General Assembly. In a September 1999 statement, the U.N. Security Council also recognized the growing problem. And there is interest at the highest levels of the United Nations as well. As noted in the introduction, the Secretary-General in January 1995 sounded a clarion call to action in the small arms and light weapons area. In the supplement to "An Agenda for Peace," he noted the considerable progress made in dealing with weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and encouraged the international community to turn its focus to the weapons that are "actually killing people in the hundreds of thousands and that are being used in the conflicts the United Nations is actually engaged in -- small arms and light weapons." In response to the Secretary-General's appeal, a groundswell of initiatives developed and continues to be pursued.
In November 1997, for example, the United States, Mexico and 26 other Western Hemisphere governments signed a convention negotiated through the Organization of American States (OAS) against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, and explosive materials. The treaty requires states to strengthen border controls, mark firearms, and share information on weapons manufacturers, dealers, importers, and exporters.
In May 1998, the 15 members of the European Union (EU) entered into a political commitment on a code of conduct governing arms transfers. The code establishes eight criteria for EU arms exports, which place restrictions on transfers to human rights violators, repressive governments, and on exports to areas of prolonged conflict. In December 1998, in an effort to combat destabilizing accumulations of small arms, EU countries also adopted a legally binding Joint Action on Small Arms. The Joint Action is designed to help stem the spread of small arms by supporting inventory reductions, regional registers, exchanges of information, enhancing national controls, improving education and awareness, and providing incentives to warring factions to surrender and destroy their arms.
In July 1998, 21 nations met in Oslo, Norway at the behest of that government for the first international government-level conference on small arms. The attendees agreed that the complexity of small arms problems requires multi-faceted actions and pursuit along a variety of parallel tracks. The Oslo consensus was embodied in a final document, "Elements of a Common Understanding," which called for global support of 11 existing international initiatives. In December 1999 a second Norway-hosted conference was held in Oslo. A geographically varied mix of 18 countries attended. The objective of that conference was to take stock of ongoing developments and to engage in in-depth discussions on arms brokering. The outcome of this second conference was another "Elements of a Common Understanding," which identified areas for further study and outlined a number of possible measures for addressing problems of arms brokering.
At the August-September 1998 Summit of Non-aligned Nations in Durban, South Africa the heads of state expressed concern over the illicit transfer and circulation of small arms and their proliferation as constituting a serious threat to national and regional security of many non-aligned nations. They urged summit attendees to take steps to deal effectively with problems of small arms through administrative and legislative means, and called upon producers and nations with the largest arsenals to reduce significantly the production and trade in conventional weapons.
Following-up on the momentum created at the first Oslo conference, the government of Belgium hosted an October 1998 first-of-a-kind conference on "Sustainable Disarmament for Sustainable Development." Approximately 90 countries plus a large number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) were represented in Brussels. The conference eschewed the idea that disarmament and development could be treated successfully in isolation from each other and called for nations to adopt an integrated approach. The Brussels conference issued a "Call for Action" outlining, in comprehensive detail, activities that the international community should consider in addressing the problems of small arms and development.
In October 1998, the 16 member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), led by the President of the Republic of Mali, Alpha Oumar Konare, declared a three-year renewable moratorium on the production, import and export of light weapons in the West African region. This was the culmination of almost 5 years of intensive efforts on the part of the government of Mali, the U.N., and other governments, both in the region and beyond, to establish the first-ever moratorium on conventional arms. An organizational mechanism was established to implement and administer the moratorium, as a number of nations consider how best to contribute to its success. The ECOWAS Moratorium is up for renewal October 31, 2001.
In addition to inter-governmental actions, NGOs have also played an important role in raising the consciousness of the international community, in carrying the burden of academic research, and in building effective data collections. They have also helped galvanize the action of governments in support of small arms and light weapon efforts. NGOs have also sponsored key conferences and seminars and participated in most government-sponsored conferences. Their constant encouragement of better cooperation between governments, civil society, and NGOs ensures that progress in the small arms field will be steady and cumulative.
The U.S. Response
In his keynote address to the 50th UNGA in October 1995, President Clinton acknowledged the need to focus more attention on the problem of small arms and on related problems of drug trafficking, smuggling, and increases in terrorism. The U.S. approach to small arms proliferation has been to address in a balanced way, both demand-side issues, or underlying causes, and supply-side issues, such as illicit trafficking. In an effort to stem illicit flows as well as better regulate legal flows, the United States uses the full range of its policy tools at all levels. U.S. demand-side efforts include initiatives by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to promote the establishment of democratic institutions and practices, continued emphasis on respect for human rights, adoption of an integrated response to complex transnational crises, implementation of a number of practical post-conflict disarmament and development measures, and support for establishing and enhancing regulatory and law enforcement capacities in threatened and war-torn societies.
On the supply side, the United States seeks to globalize "best practices," including: encouraging global adoption of model regulations on commercial arms transfers; imposition of controls on arms brokering and re-export transactions; supporting the effective implementation of the recently completed Vienna Firearms Protocol (March, 2, 2001) based on the OAS model; providing assistance for stockpile security and weapons destruction; and promoting the early conclusion of an international agreement to restrict man-portable air defense systems. In the fall of 1998, the United States launched a series of important policy initiatives directed primarily at the nexus of arms flows and conflict in Africa.
Owing to the commitment demonstrated by its actions, the United States is recognized as a leader in efforts to control small arms and light weapons. As a supplier nation, the United States has taken seriously its responsibility to maintain the highest standards of transparency, export controls, restraint in arms transfers, and regulation of brokering activities. The United States has established partnerships with like-minded states to address a range of small arms and light weapons issues that include weapons destruction, coordinating assistance to affected states, supporting regional initiatives, and strengthening enforcement of U.N. Security Council embargoes.
At the special September 1999 U.N. Security Council Ministerial Meeting on Africa, the United States initiated a number of concrete measures which over the last two years it has implemented. These include:
• commitments to full and timely disclosure of all arms shipments being transferred into regions or zones of conflict in Africa;
• international support for a voluntary moratorium on arms sales that could fuel inter-connected conflicts;
• meetings of governments and international and non-governmental organizations to exchange information on regional arms transfers;
• increased aid for capacity-building in Africa to monitor and interdict arms flows and strengthen sanctions enforcement;
• adoption of national legislation to criminalize violations of mandatory arms embargoes and other sanctions regimes; and
• support for effective implementation of the Firearms Protocol and the multilateral agreement restricting the export of man-portable defense systems.
These initiatives complemented and reinforced a number of existing U.S. initiatives directed at ending violence in Africa. For instance, in 1994, the U.S. government enacted the African Conflict Resolution Act, which requires U.S. agencies to report to Congress annually on their efforts to improve conflict resolution capabilities in Africa. At the March 1999 U.S.-Africa Ministerial called "Partnership for the 21st Century," the United States reaffirmed support for the Africa Crisis Response initiative (ACRI). Since 1993 the U.S. has contributed $8 million (U.S.) to support the ACRI.
The United States led a number of actions directed at ending and preventing the recurrence of genocide in Rwanda, including: meeting with other heads of states at the Entebbe Summit in March of 1998; sponsoring the U.N. resolution that reactivated the U.N. Arms Flow Commission to identify and stop illegal arms trafficking to former Rwanda army and militia forces; and lending U.S. support to the U.N. Secretary-General's April 1998 Report to the Security Council on The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable Development in Africa. Early in 2000, the United States began work with the U.N.'s African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (UNAFRI) to survey the regulations, laws, and capacities of African nations. Work on that project continues. The United States continues its efforts to extend political, technical, and material support to the efforts of Mali and its neighbors to implement the moratorium on the import, export, and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa.
Also, the United States participates in a wide range of international meetings, conferences and workshops including the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Small Arms, whose 1997 and 1999 reports made a number of recommendations that the U.S. has endorsed. The United States also participates in the U.N. Disarmament Commission's discussions of Practical Disarmament.
In addition to U.N.-sponsored meetings, the United States sent senior-level delegations to the Oslo and Brussels conferences and played a prominent role in negotiating the documents agreed to at each. The United States supports and participates in the consultations on small arms issues within the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe, the European-Atlantic Partnership Council and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
The United States has consulted with Norway, Canada, South Africa, and other key countries and has maintained a high-level dialogue with Belgium, to help develop further the international small arms agenda and to share ideas on future plans in disarmament and development.
The United States participates in the 33-member Wassenaar Arrangement, the Group of Six on Arms, the G-8 Lyon Group Firearms Subgroup, and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Forum, where it has issued a Joint U.S.-SADC Declaration on small arms and light weapons and has established a Joint Working Group to deal with small arms and light weapons issues.
The United States has been an active player in the process leading up to the 2001 U.N. Conference on Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, scheduled to take place at U.N. Headquarters, July 9-20, 2001. The objective of the Conference is to agree on a politically binding Program of Action containing measures that will help mitigate the effects of the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. The United States will remain a key participant in international efforts to resolve the small arms and light weapons issue, and a principal provider of funds for destruction of excess weapons, and for training and other assistance to help affected countries fight the excessive and destabilizing accumulations of small arms and light weapons. The United States also will continue to work within the 2001 U.N. Conference to achieve a consensus Program of Action that will result in an effective global small arms and light weapons regime against the illicit trade in these weapons.
The international community has demonstrated energy and considerable political will in its efforts to address the small arms and light weapons problem. Because of the severity and complexity of the problem, achievement of a long-term, comprehensive resolution is likely to be far into the future. To mitigate even the most immediate and devastating negative effects will require creativity, flexibility, and multifaceted approaches that cut across disciplines. The international community has made a good start, and the 2001 U.N. Conference offers a unique opportunity to lay a solid foundation for an effective global regime.
The following directory is just a sample of some weapons. Our other reports for clients contained a complete listing of all know international weapons currently in use. This report included detail photos and diagrams with specifications. This public listing indicates just a few of these weapons for obvious reasons. Of course, the United States has provided some of these weapons and training to groups who at one point may be allied with the U.S and later use the same weapons and training against the U.S. There lies the problem when superpowers flood the third world with international weapons and training.
The RPG-7 is one of the most common anti-tank weapons in the world. Although designed as an anti-tank weapons it's characteristics make it an ideal weapon for terrorist against civilian VIP targets. It can also be used as an effective anti-sniper weapon within its 300 meter flat trajectory range.
The RPG-7 is, along with its successor, the RPG-16, the main weapon of the Soviet soldier against enemy tanks. They are supplemented by the RPG-18, a copy of the M72 66 mm light anti-tank weapon used by US and British forces.
The RPG-7 has a long combat record. In the 1973 Middle East War, thy destroyed more Israeli tanks on the northern front than any other weapon. The Israelis themselves have adopted large numbers of captured RPG-7s and have designed and produced a similar weapon. In Afghanistan the Soviets have lost many tanks to RPG-7s especially in the first year of the war. Both sides in the Iran / Iraq war have made extensive use of RPG-7s.
The Chinese have provided two range-finding reticles on their home-made version of the RPG-7, one for Soviet and one for larger Western built tanks. The Afghan Resistance who use both Soviet and Chinese build version of the RPG-7 think the Chinese ammunition is better and has fewer mis-fires. The Afghan resistance fighters also used the improved RPG-16.
Warhead: 85 mm grenade, contact electric fuse, 94% RDX and 6% wax. RDX or Cyclonite is a very powerful high explosive
Note: The improved PG-7M warhead entered service in 1980
FIM-92 A System
(Stinger)
The U.S. FIM-92A system, or "Stinger" is a man-portable surface-to-air missile system which began production in 1979 by General Dynamics. It is comprised of the launcher assembly with a missile, a grip stock, an IFF (Identification Friend or Foe) interrogator, an argon gas Battery Coolant Unit (BCU), and an impulse generator (battery energizer) unit. The FIM-92A initial operational capability was 1981.
The infra-red seeker in the nose enables the missile to home in on the heat emissions from a target aircraft. Since many air forces employ counter-measurers such as dropping flares to confuse this sort of homing device, an ultraviolet detector will probably be fitted to the improved stinger.
Guidance: Passive infrared homing, Dual Mode IR/UV
Propulsion: Solid fuel ejection motor, dual thrust booster and sustainer motor
Warhead: 3 kg HE (high explosive)-fragmentation with contact fuse
Maximum Speed: 1.7 Mach
Engagement Range: 0.3 kilometers to < 6.0 kilometers
Engagement Altitude: < 4,000 meters to 10,000 meters
Reaction Time: 10 seconds
System Deployment Time: 5 seconds
Missile Preparation Time: 5 seconds
Launcher: Man-Portable Fitted IFF System
FIM-43A System
"Redeye"
The U.S. FIM-43A system, or "Redeye", was developed as a shoulder-launched, infrared guided, fire-and-forget surface-to-air missile in 1956 by General Dynamics. The system is comprised of three components: the M46A2 molded material launcher assembly, the M41 missile, and the launcher battery/coolant unit. The launcher includes an integral grip-stock, open-sight aperture and cover, and the missile launcher-container tube. The FIM-43A initial operational capability was 1967.
Guidance: Passive Infrared homing
Propulsion: Solid fuel dual thrust ejection and sustainer rocket motor
Warhead: 2 kg HE (High Explosive) Fragmentation with contact fuze
Maximum Speed: 1.6 Mach
Engagement Range: 0.6 kilometers to 4.0 kilometers
Engagement Altitude: < 25 meters to < 3,800 meters
Reaction Time: 10 seconds
System Deployment Time: 5 seconds
Missile Preparation Time: 5 seconds
Launcher: Man-portable single-round disposable with grip-stock
SA-7a System
"Grail"
The development of the FSU SA-7a, or "Grail", was completed in 1965 and entered Soviet Army service in 1966. The SA-7a surface-to-air missile system consists of the missile and its launch container canister, a re-loadable grip-stock, and a can like thermal battery. Variants include the North Korea PGLM System and the Yugoslavian Strela-2M/A. The SA-7a initial operational capability was 1968.
Guidance: Infrared passive homing
Propulsion: Solid fuel booster and solid fuel sustainer rocket motor
Warhead: 1.1 kg HE (High Explosive) smooth fragmentation with contact and graze fuzing.
Maximum Target Speed: 450 meters per second
Engagement Range: 0.5 Kilometers to 4.2 kilometers
Engagement Altitude: 25 meters to 4,000 meters
Reaction Time: 10 seconds
System Deployment Time: 10 seconds
Missile Preparation Time: 5 seconds
Launcher: Man-portable single-round disposable with grip-stock
SA-7b System
"Grail"
The development of the FSU SA-7b, or "Grail", (Strela-2M/9K32m) man-portable missile system was specifically designed to destroy visually acquired aerial targets such as helicopters and aircraft. The system also can engage and destroy hovering targets provided they are within the launch envelope and emitting sufficient heat energy for the seeker to lock on. The SA-7b missile system consists of the missile, reusable launch tube, grip-stock launch mechanism, and disposable thermal battery power supply unit. The SA-7b initial operation capability was 1972.
Guidance: Single channel passive infrared homing
Propulsion: Solid fuel ejection, booster, and sustainer rocket motor
Warhead: 1.1 kg HE (High Explosive) fragmentation with contact and graze fuzing
Maximum Speed: 500 meters per second
Engagement Range: 0.5 kilometers to 4.2 kilometers
Engagement Altitude: 10 meters to 4,500 meters
Reaction Time: 14-17 seconds
System Deployment Time: 10 seconds
Missile Preparation Time: 5 seconds
Launcher: Man-portable single-round disposable with grip-stock
SA-14 System
"Gremlin"
The FSU SA-14, or "Gremlin", is a man-portable missile system, as compared to the SA-7 series, consists of an up-graded rocket motor, more powerful warhead, cryogenically cooled passive infrared homing seeker with proportional guidance. It is distinguished from its predecessor in that it has a ball-shaped battery/coolant reserve in the front of the grip-stock. The SA-14 initial operational capability was 1977.
Guidance: Cooled infrared homing
Propulsion: Solid fuel booster and solid fuel sustainer rocket motor
Warhead: 2 kg HE (High Explosive) fragmentation with contact and graze fuzing
Maximum Speed: 600 Meters per second
Engagement Range: 0.6 kilometers to 6.0 kilometers
Engagement Altitude: 10 meters to 5,500 meters
Reaction Time: 10 to 13 seconds
System Deployment Time: 10 seconds
Missile Preparation Time: 5 seconds
Launcher: Man-portable single-round disposable with grip-stock
SA-16
"Gimlet"
The FSU SA-16, or "Gimlet", man-portable missile system was considered to be a highly accurate weapon system to replace the SA-7 system. The SA-16 system is comprised of a missile in a 9M313-1 launch tube with a 9P515-2 grip-stock launch mechanism and a portable battery power unit. The SA-16 initial operational capability was 1981. Like the SA-14, The SA-16 has a ball-shaped battery/coolant reserve (A) at the front of the grip-stock as compared to a simpler can-shaped thermal battery on the SA-7 "Grail" family. However, the SA-16 battery is canted at a downward angle of about 10 degrees relative to the launch tube. The most distinctive difference between the SA-14 and the SA-16 missiles is the nose shape (B). The SA-14 uses a traditional hemispherical optical head, while the SA-16 head is a conical, pyramidal shape.
Guidance: Cooled infrared homing
Propulsion: Three-stage solid propellant ejection, booster, and sustainer
Warhead: 2 kg HE (High Explosive) fragmentation with contact and graze fuzing
Maximum Target Speed: 680 meters per second
Engagement Range: 0.6 kilometers to 5.0 kilometers
Engagement Altitude: 10 meters to 3,500 meters
Reaction Time: 10 to 13 seconds
System Deployment Time: 10 seconds
Missile Preparation Time: 5 seconds
Launcher: Man-portable single-round disposable with grip-stock
SA-18
"Grouse"
The FSU SA-18 "Grouse", system is designed to defeat low-flying aerial targets head-on and in the tail-chasing modes. The SA-18 possesses electronic counter-counter-measurer capabilities. The missile system consists of a missile in a launch tube (also used as a container), external power supply, launching mechanism, training device and a mobile maintenance test set. The missile can be launched by an anti-aircraft gunner from a shoulder-standing firing position, or from the shoulder-kneeling firing position with an open field of view. The SA-18 initial operational capability was 1984.
Guidance: Infrared homing
Propulsion: Solid propellant ejection, booster, and sustainer
Warhead: Blast fragmentation
Maximum Target Speed: 680 meters per second
Engagement Range: 0.5 kilometers to 5.2 kilometers
Engagement Altitude: 10 meters to 3,500 meters
Reaction Time: 13 seconds
Missile Mass At Launch: 10.6 kg
RPG-16
Afghan with RPG-16
This is an improved version of the RPG-7.
The RPG-16 has a smaller caliber warhead and an improved rocket booster which offers an improvement in accuracy and range over the earlier version of the RPG-7. The effective range is 800 meters with armor penetration of 300mm. It has a 2x power sight. It is supplemented by the RPG-18 a copy of the M72 66mm light anti-tank weapon.
Other weapons include:
AK74
AR18
CETME
HECKLER & KOCH 33
MINI14
STEYR
AK-47
DRAGUNOV
HECKLER&KOCHG3
L7A2
MAUSER
PPSH41
VAIME
DRAGUNOV KNOCKOFF
9MMF1
MPI69
L2A3
UZI
FN
M203
FOLGORE
KALASHNIKOV
BERETTA
CETMEL5.56
RUGER
AK53
AKM
FABRIQUE
HK21
M14
PARKER HALE
PKGPMG
VALMET M76
FUSIL
MP5
PA3DM
STERLING
M1
GRANATEPISTOLE
B300
ACC
AR70
FAMAS
AR15
SA80
MAS4956
BERETTA SNIPER
GALIL
L1A1
M60
SKS
STEYR
VZ52
HKMP5
SPECTRE
AK RIFLES
WALTHER2000
HK79
DELISLE
CARL GUSTAV
ARMALITE
CETME5.56
FNC
M16A2
SAR80
BREN
FNFAL
GALIL
M21
PKGPMG
SKS
TYPE 64
SKORPION
PM12
L34A1
STAR
AUG
AGS17
M79
PANZERFAUST
SEP DARD
G41
