The following section is intended for use primarily by the professional security staff of a company that owns and operates aircraft in foreign environment however; many of the following suggestions are applicable in the U.S. as well. Based on my personal experiences, I believe several of the suggestions offered here will also be useful to owners of general aviation aircraft desiring guidelines for improving the security of their investment.
Corporate aircraft operators are not exempt from criminal activities and, should be aware of terrorists groups attempting to promote a particular cause through exploitation of the company's aviation assets. The military defense industrial complex, international corporations with operations in countries with civil unrest, corporations whose products and operations are of a controversial nature, and corporations experiencing labor unrest, are all potential targets for acts of air piracy, sabotage, extortion, bombings and other criminal acts.
The safe operation of corporate aircraft must balance security planning with flight planning. Every pilot knows that the ultimate responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft rest with the pilot in command. However; without the full support of the aircraft owner and operator, this responsibility would be a significant challenge.
Airport operators are required, in most cases, to provide for the physical security of the air operations area as an integral part of their overall responsibility for the operation of that airport. The suggestions offered here are intended to complement these efforts, where possible, and direct the user at all times to coordinate their efforts with the responsible airport operator.
The first line of defense against threats to the safety of corporate aircraft operations is the protection against unauthorized access to the aircraft and ground support facilities or areas. Aircraft owners and operators who are involved in establishing or maintaining protective measures for corporate aircraft should also consider the presence or absence of an airport security program, as required by FAA. It should be noted that since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 there have been many major revisions in the rules and regulations governing both domestic and international aircraft operations. The following information should always be considered in the context of “current” local, state, federal and international rules and regulations governing aircraft operations.
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A corporate security plan should be a written document detailing positive measures to protect the aircraft at its home base, in-flight, and at airports where the aircraft is parked during a transit status. Access to the plan should be limited to those who have an operational need to know, in order to preserve its integrity.
A security awareness program in a corporate aviation department should be established to promote initial and recurrent security training of all personnel, including ¬clerical, maintenance personnel, flight crews, and not just the employees who are directly responsible for security. System testing should also be an integral part of the program and should include all elements of the plan.
The security plan must have the full support of the chief executive officer of the organization, and those responsible for it should be held accountable for its success to the same degree as are other corporate efforts.
BASIC AIRCRAFT PROTECTION MEASURES
The following suggestions should be considered when developing a protection plan:
• Where possible, the aircraft should be parked in a locked or guarded hangar. Dependence upon a locked hangar for protection should include strict access control measures. Placement of an aircraft within a hangar does not eliminate the necessity for securing the aircraft.
• Security of an unattended aircraft may be improved through the use of devices such as special anti tampering tape on doors, windows, ports, inspection plates which once applied cannot be removed under normal conditions. Tape that is weatherproof, heat resistant and available with self destroying slits will enhance the tamper detection capability.
• Due to the widespread unauthorized possession of master keys to manufacturer installed locks, and the possibility of loss of key control with the passage of time, the security of manufacturer installed locks may not always be assured. If in doubt, consideration should be given to the replacement of the locks on corporate aircraft with high quality, professionally installed locks.
• Positive key control is used to protect many valuable corporate assets; the flight department contains or transports many of them and should, therefore, be subject to the highest control standards in the corporation.
• All avionics and removable items in the aircraft should be marked for positive identification. Positive identification of each item is an absolute necessity to facilitate the investigative and recovery efforts of local, state and federal authorities in addition to providing some deterrence. A color marking, in addition to engraved aircraft registration numbers, or any other unique identifying numbers or symbols, is recommended. The engraved marking provides a means of positive identification and the color marking provides a deterrent value.
• Non installed items of value or of unusual interest should not be stored in the aircraft if it is to be unattended for any extended period of time. If storage in the aircraft is absolutely necessary, these items should be secured.
• A thorough inventory of the contents of the aircraft should be maintained on file at its home base. The inventory should include serial numbers and other identifying data. Color photographs of the aircraft exterior and interior spaces should also be maintained with the inventory.
• Consideration should be given to the use of anti theft devices such as alarms or removable wheel locks. While such devices are not foolproof, they are a deterrent and could result in a diversion of an attack on an unprotected aircraft. Such devices may also bring about an early detection and apprehension by authorities. This is an especially important consideration at airports where the corporate aircraft will remain unattended overnight when the aircraft is not in a hangar.
• The display of corporate logos and product or organizational identification media is not recommended. This could increase the threat of attack for several reasons.
• Aircraft parked on the ramp should always be parked in a well illuminated area and away from perimeter gates and fencing.
• Positive identification of all passengers is a must. If a passenger is not a known corporate official or guest, identification and trip authorization should be verified before the individual is allowed access to the aircraft. Safeguards should be established assuring that all baggage to be loaded on board the aircraft matches those passengers on board, and that the baggage was not left unattended and accessible prior to its loading.
• Safeguards should be established for cargo to be transported on board the aircraft to assure that each package is received from a known source and has been authorized by the flight department.
• Procedures should be established for the search of passengers, baggage, and packages or cargo in the event of the receipt of threats, or in the event of other questionable circumstances.
• All persons working on the aircraft should be positively identified, especially at airports where other than corporate employees are called upon to perform maintenance or repair work.
• Crew vigilance should be heightened while the aircraft is being re fueled by persons representing a company which does not normally do business with the flight department.
• Once engines are started, be suspicious of any attempts to delay, stop, or otherwise impede the departure from other than air traffic control authorities.
HANGAR SECURITY
The following suggestions should be considered when developing a hangar security plan:
• Aircraft should always be placed in a secure hangar whenever possible.
• Designate the hangar as a closed or restricted area and control access into it from the public side of the airport.
• Depending upon the size of the flight department, use corporate identification badges unless preceded by an airport authority operating under an approved FAA security program.
• Unless under escort, visitors should not be permitted into the hangar area where aircraft are stored, or in the immediate ramp area where the aircraft are readied for flight.
• Pedestrian doors to the hangar should deny access to unauthorized persons. Doors which open into an office area should be designated for passengers, visitors or delivery access to the flight department.
• Consider establishment of a waiting lounge for passengers to wait until boarding is announced, or pending identification and approval for boarding.
• If large, air side hangar doors are left open for ventilation, expansion type barriers should be deployed to delay unauthorized access into the hangar area.
• Where possible, visual observation of the hangar and ramp parking areas should be maintained.
• All unauthorized personnel should be challenged. Suspicious individuals should be immediately reported to the supporting law enforcement agency.
• An alarm system is recommended to protect the hangar during unoccupied periods. Guards with adequate communications equipment offer added protection of extremely valuable or threatened assets.
• Employee and non employee parking should be separated.
• The air side should be physically separated from the public side in the vicinity of the hangar. A seven foot chain link fence with three strand barbed wire overhang is the minimum recommended.
• Vehicle parking or the storage of items on the ground, within 20 feet of the perimeter fence should be prohibited, as it provides an easy means to go over the fence.
• Outside illumination of the hangar and immediate fencing is highly recommended.
• Consideration should be given to lease provisions allowing control of the ramp areas where corporate aircraft are parked or are readied for flight. The controlled area should be sufficient to provide a buffer zone between the aircraft and non controlled access areas. The marking of a controlled area as a restricted area is sometimes accomplished by lines and symbols painted on the ramp surface. Markings applied to a ramp area are very often subject to specific requirements. The airport operator should be consulted prior to applying any permanent ramp markings.
• A policy should be established and enforced requiring passengers to board through the operations office or passenger lounge, and, except for maintenance and service support, prohibiting vehicles on the ramp side.
• When cargo must be transported to the aircraft, flight department personnel should admit the vehicle to the ramp only after verification of authenticity of the shipment and the driver, and accompany the delivery van to the aircraft.
• Positive access controls should be enforced, including the positive identification and recording of all visitors.
• Assure that a comprehensive emergency or bomb threat plan is in effect and that the telephone numbers of the airport's supporting law enforcement agency and Explosive Ordnance Disposal resources are readily available.
• Ensure that the facility is periodically visited by the airport's supporting law enforcement patrols.
“REMAIN-OVER-NIGHT” AIRPORT CONSIDERATIONS
The following suggestions should be considered when an aircraft has to remain over night:
• Prior to any departure from the home base, the servicing fixed base operator at any remain over night airport should be contacted in advance and advised of any unusual security requirements required to protect the aircraft while at that airport.
• The flight crew should be provided with telephone numbers of all offices and watch personnel having responsibility for protecting the area at a remain-over-night airport.
• Aircraft should be in a hangar whenever possible. If it is not, the aircraft should be parked in a well illuminated secure area away from perimeter gates and fencing.
• In threat conditions, especially outside the U.S., arrangements for a guard on the aircraft should be considered a necessity.
• When taxiing to the parking location, a non flying crewmember should carefully scan the area to detect any unusual conditions.
• The flight crew should visit the aircraft at least once daily at remain-over-night airports to inspect the aircraft and assure that it is properly secured and that there are no signs of tampering.
• The keys to the aircraft should never be left with the Fixed-Base Operator unless they are properly secured and controlled to the satisfaction of the pilot in command.
• If maintenance or repairs are required of a firm not normally providing services to the flight department, a flight crew member should be present, and the repairman should be positively identified as an employee of the servicing firm.
• A security inspection of the aircraft to detect tampering or foreign objects is critical prior to any departure from a remain-over-night airport.
IN FLIGHT SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS
The following suggestions should be considered as part of an in-flight security plan:
• Flight crews should frequently review plans developed by the security department to handle in flight emergencies and threats. Plans of action should include actions to take in the event of a bomb threat, attempted hijacking, or terrorist attack. These plans should be consistent, to the extent possible, with those developed to protect other corporate assets from similar threats.
• If the cockpit is separated by a door from the cabin, unauthorized personnel should not be permitted into the cockpit.
• In the event of a hijacking, the following suggestions should be considered:
A special emergency condition exists when a hostile act is threatened or committed by a person(s) aboard an aircraft which jeopardizes the safety of the aircraft or its passengers.
The pilot of an aircraft reporting a special emergency should if possible, implement standard distress or urgency radiotelephone procedures providing the details of the special emergency. If circumstances do not permit the use of prescribed distress or urgency procedures, transmit on the air/ground frequency in use at the time as many of the following elements as possible, spoken distinctly and in the following order:
(a) Name of the station addressed including time and circumstances.
(b) The identification of the aircraft and present position.
(c) The nature of the special emergency condition and pilot intentions.
(d) If unable to provide this information, use code words and/or transponder codes. This will alert air traffic controllers of the emergency. Transponder codes and code words should be restricted to responsible officials in the flight department. Flight crews should be thoroughly familiar with their meaning and use. Mistaken use of these codes and code words could have severe consequences.
• If it is possible to do so without jeopardizing the safety of the flight crew and passengers, the pilot of a hijacked passenger aircraft, after departing from the cleared routing over which the aircraft was operating, should consider the following:
(a) Maintain a true airspeed of no more than 400 knots, and preferably an altitude between 10,000 and 25,000 feet.
(b) Fly a course toward the destination which the hijacker has announced.
• If these procedures result in radio contact or air intercept, the pilot will attempt to comply with any instructions received which may direct him/her to an appropriate landing field.
• In the event of a hijacking or any other disturbance, or upon learning an unauthorized person may be aboard the aircraft, the flight crew should:
(a) Get the aircraft on the ground under any pretext.
(b) Get the passengers and then the flight crew off the aircraft, if possible.
(c) Allow law enforcement to deal with the hijackers or other disturbances.
• Only authorized officials should have access to bomb threat, search, and in flight hijack incident management procedures.
LAW ENFORCEMENT CONSIDERATIONS
The following legal and law enforcement should be reviewed and updated as required:
• Theft, damage, or destruction of general aviation and corporate aircraft, or contents, is a criminal offense. The law enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the offense was committed typically has primary jurisdiction. All such offenses should be promptly reported to that agency for investigation and prosecution.
• The interstate transportation of a stolen aircraft is a violation of Title 18 of the U.S. Code, and is a federal offense investigated by the FBI. Such offenses may be reported directly to the local FBI office or reported through the local law enforcement agency.
• Arson, malicious damaging, destruction, disablement, or wrecking of any civil aviation aircraft used, operated, or employed in interstate, overseas, or foreign air commerce; or any aircraft engine, propeller, appliance, or spare part with intent to damage, destroy, disable, or wreck any such aircraft; or, with like intent, placement of a destructive substance in, upon, or in proximity to any such aircraft or components or times used in connection with the operation of the aircraft or cargo carried; or with like intent wrecks, damages, destroys, disables, or places a destructive substance in or upon or in proximity to support facilities used in connection with the operation; or with like intent, willfully incapacitates any member of the crew of such aircraft, is a violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, and is a federal offense investigated by the FBI.
• Any forgery, counterfeiting, alteration, or false marking of a certificate issued under the authority of the Federal Aviation Act and/or the willful display of markings that are false or misleading as to the nationality or registration of the aircraft are federal criminal offenses under Title 49, U.S. Code.
• Interference with air navigation through display of a light or signal in such a manner to be mistaken for a true signal in connection with an airport or other air navigation facility, or any removal, extinguishing of, or interference with the operation of any such true light or signal is a federal criminal offense.
• Interference with flight crew members while aboard an aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the U.S. by assaults, intimidation, or threats so as to interfere with the performance by such member of his/her duties or lessen the ability of the flight crew member to perform his/her duties is a federal criminal offense under Title 49, U.S. Code, and is investigated by the FBI.
• Aircraft piracy, i.e., any seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence with wrongful intent, of an aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the U.S. is a federal criminal offense, punishable by death or imprisonment for not less than 20 years.
GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL FLIGHT OPERATIONS
The following suggestions should be considered as part of international flight operations:
• Prior to the start of any foreign trips, consult with the Department of State, Travel Advisory Service and provide a briefing for all scheduled passengers before the flight.
• When traveling to an area of economic strife, make advance arrangements to provide for a reliable security and guard service.
• Know the telephone numbers of the nearest U.S. Embassy or consulate and, if unsure of any political, economic or other local factors which might affect security, contact them directly before departure.
• Advise all crew members and passengers en-route to a foreign location to be cautious when accepting gifts or packages of which the contents are unknown. Query all aboard prior to departure of their knowledge of all personal or business related goods acquired outside of the U.S.
• Physically inspect all goods for which any uncertainty exists.
